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CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON
SEQUESTRATION, AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Alexandra B. Klass*
Elizabeth J. Wilson**
This Article considers the role of property rights in efforts to se-
quester underground hundreds of millions of tons of carbon dioxide
(C02) per year from power plants and other industrial facilities in or-
der to mitigate climate change. This technology, known as carbon
capture and sequestration (CCS), could provide deep emission cuts,
particularly from coal power generation, on a worldwide basis. In
order to widely deploy this technology, future CCS operators must be
able to access millions of acres of deep subsurface "pore space"
roughly a kilometer below the earth's surface to sequester the CO2 for
hundreds to thousands of years. This Article explores questions relat-
ing to ownership of subsurface pore space, physical takings, regulato-
ry takings, and just compensation that will necessarily accompany the
implementation of CCS in the United States. In order to accommo-
date the full range of property rights and takings issues that will arise
with CCS, this Article proposes a regulatory framework based in part
on the Natural Gas Act to address these issues in connection with
subsurface CO2 sequestration.
INTRODUCTION
In February 2009, President Obama signed the $787 billion econom-
ic stimulus package known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment
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Act.1 At that time, representatives from industry, government, and non-
profit groups in the energy and natural resources field focused imme-
diately on the $80 billion in spending, loan guarantees, and tax incentives
geared toward promoting energy efficiency, renewable energy, and new
technologies to reduce emissions from the use of coal and other fossil fu-
els.2 On their own, these investments constitute the biggest energy bill in
history.' Notably, this $80 billion includes $3.4 billion for carbon capture
and sequestration (CCS) demonstration projects, an increase in federal
support for this technology in the United States by 70 percent to over $8
billion.'
CCS involves capturing CO 2 from power generation and industrial
processes, transporting the CO2 to an area with suitable geology, and in-jecting it into deep geologic formations, sequestering the CO 2 under-
ground for long periods of time.' Geological formations suitable for CO 2
sequestration include oil and gas fields, saline aquifers, and possibly deep
coal seams.6 Natural analogs, such as geologic formations containing
crude oil, natural gas, and CO, have demonstrated that these fluids can
be securely held for millions of years.7 CCS technologies take advantage
of the sequestration capability of geologic formations to store injected
CO2 and reduce CO 2 emissions going into the atmosphere in an effort to
mitigate climate change.'
This Article considers the role of property rights in efforts to devel-
op CCS. In an earlier Article, we discussed the potential environmental
and tort liability associated with CCS. 9 In that Article, we argued that
environmental and tort liability could serve an important role within a
federal framework of CCS regulation to ensure proper site selection and
monitoring as well as provide compensation for harm to governments
and private parties caused by escaping CO2. 10 We then proposed an
adaptive governance model at the federal level for integrating several
1. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted).
2. See Editorial, An $80 Billion Start, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A26; Linda Roeder & Janice
Valverde, Economic Stimulus, 40 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 365 (Feb. 20, 2009).
3. An $80 Billion Start, supra note 2.
4. Flurry of U.S. State, Federal Policies Advance CCS, CARBON CAPTURE J., Feb. 20, 2009,
http://www.carboncapturejournal.com/displaynews.php?NewslD=344&PHPSESSID=1043389bcbaec9
b35c510344a0524b43&PHPSESSID=1043389bcbaec9b35c510344a0524b43.
5. Stephanie M. Haggerty, Note, Legal Requirements for Widespread Implementation of CO2
Sequestration in Depleted Oil Reserves, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 197, 200-01 (2003).
6. Id. at 201.
7. See Sally Benson et al., Underground Geological Storage, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON
CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 195, 210 (Bert Metz et al. eds. 2005), http://www.ipcc.
ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs wholereport.pdf [hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON
DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE] (noting that in the Pisgah Anticline, near Jackson, Mississippi, 200
metric tons of naturally occurring CO2 is thought to have been stored for over 65 million years without
leakage).
8. Paul Freund et al., Introduction, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE
AND STORAGE, supra note 7, at 51, 53.
9. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: As-
sessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103 (2008).
10. Id. at 178-79.
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different compensation mechanisms, including bonding, insurance, and
pooled federal funding, into commercial CCS project management to
better provide financial security to investors without destroying existing
liability protections for those who may suffer harm from CCS. 11
In this Article, we turn to property rights in the context of geologic
sequestration of CO2 in the deep subsurface. To "geologically sequester"
CO2, the gas is compressed to a supercritical fluid and injected a kilome-
ter or deeper into the microscopic "pore space" in the deep subsurface
rock matrix, displacing the in situ brine.12 Injected CO2 flows through
and fills the pore spaces in permeable layers of the rock matrix and,
while more buoyant than the native brines, its upward migration is pre-
vented by less permeable rock layers. 3 In order to widely implement
CCS, geologic sequestration project operators and state and federal gov-
ernments must be able to access millions of acres of deep subsurface pore
space roughly a kilometer below the earth's surface to sequester the CO2
for hundreds to thousands of years. Who currently owns that pore
space? Are any rights to the pore space vested in the owner of the sur-
face lands above the pore space? What if the mineral rights have been
severed and transferred to a third party, as is the case in many states
where CO2 sequestration is being proposed?14 Or does the federal gov-
ernment own the pore space because it is so far beneath the surface that
neither the surface owner nor the mineral owner has ever had a reason-
able expectation that it would make use of that space? If rights to the
pore space are in fact vested in a surface owner or mineral owner, can
the federal government exercise the power of eminent domain to imple-
ment CCS as a "public use" under the Fifth Amendment? If so, what
constitutes "just" compensation? If the government restricts private sur-
face or subsurface use of property to protect the integrity of a nearby
CO2 sequestration reservoir, does that restriction constitute a regulatory
taking giving the surface owner or mineral owner a right to just compen-
sation?
Here, we explore these questions associated with subsurface proper-
ty rights and CCS and provide a range of options for policymakers and
judges who undoubtedly will be forced to grapple with these questions if
efforts to implement CCS move forward. In general, while the courts
have regularly found that government-authorized physical use or inva-
sion of private surface lands constitutes a per se taking, the courts have
just as often taken a more cautious and nuanced approach to private
property rights in both the airspace above and the subsurface below pri-
vate lands.15
11. Id. at 158.
12. Edward Rubin et al., Technical Summary, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE
CAPTURE AND STORAGE, supra note 7, at 17, 31.
13. Id.
14. See Benson et al., supra note 7, at 256.
15. See infra Part III.
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A review of the existing case law involving property rights in air-
space, the surface, and the subsurface reveals that there is precedent
available to reach legal conclusions in favor of a strong protectable prop-
erty interest in the subsurface, a weak or nonexistent protectable proper-
ty interest in the subsurface, and various points in between.16 As a result,
legislative declarations by Congress or the Administration on the public
necessity of CCS as one solution to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs), as
well as public opinion on that topic, may play a significant role in deter-
mining the extent to which courts will recognize a protectable property
interest in the subsurface. Ultimately, policymakers and judges will need
to balance the extent to which they wish to recognize and protect private
property rights in the subsurface against a desire to facilitate CCS in part
through creating easy access to subsurface pore space. This Article at-
tempts to give lawmakers and judges a framework in which to make
these difficult decisions.
In resolving these issues, the government or CO2 injectors may ar-
gue that just as surface owners could no longer claim rights to the air-
space far above their property after the advent of airplanes, surface own-
ers and mineral rights owners can no longer assert rights to the deep
subsurface in the face of cutting-edge technologies that would make real
use of that subsurface for the public goal of combating climate change. 7
There is an equally strong argument, however, that property rights in the
subsurface have a completely different legal history than rights to the air-
space, and thus there are protectable property interests in pore space
that are vested in the surface owner, the mineral owner, or both. Indeed,
three states-Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming-have already de-
clared as a matter of statute that subsurface pore space ownership is
vested in the surface owner.18 As a result, existing and future creation or
modification of subsurface property rights ultimately may be in tension
with federal policies attempting to implement CCS with minimal proper-
ty acquisition costs.
Part I begins with an introduction to CCS technology, its potential
role in addressing climate change on a global basis, recent federal, state,
and industry efforts to promote CCS technology, and how implementa-
tion of CCS technology may intersect with subsurface property rights.'9
Part II introduces takings jurisprudence and then explores the extent to
which surface and mineral owners have protectable property rights in the
subsurface pore space. In this Part, we provide a range of options based
on available precedent in areas involving rights in the airspace, the sur-
face, and the subsurface.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1022-25
(2008).
18. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
19. In this Article, we concentrate our analysis on the "sequestration" part of CCS.
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In Part III, we explore more fully the extent to which CCS opera-
tions may result in either a physical taking or a regulatory taking. In this
area, there are arguments to be made that to the extent the implementa-
tion of CCS results in a permanent, physical occupation of the subsurface
pore space, there is a per se physical taking that requires just compensa-
tion, and the only significant question is whether that compensation will
be nominal or significant. There is also precedent to support an alterna-
tive conclusion, however, namely that where physical occupation of CO2
takes place far below any existing or reasonably foreseeable economic
uses, no physical taking has occurred. In other situations, CO2 sequestra-
tion may not result in a physical occupation of the subsurface but may
still modify, limit, or prohibit existing or future uses of that subsurface
because of regulatory limits imposed to protect the integrity of a nearby
CO2 sequestration reservoir. In those circumstances, courts would con-
duct a regulatory takings analysis that would balance the character of the
government's action, the severity of the economic impact, and the extent
to which the regulation interferes with the property owner's distinct, in-
vestment-backed expectations. Based on this analysis, we conclude that
in most cases, actions to sequester CO2 to address climate change goals
would outweigh most regulatory restrictions on nearby subsurface use,
assuming such restrictions do not eliminate all economic value relating to
the property owner's surface and subsurface use. Part III concludes with
a discussion of the issue of "just compensation" and factors that may play
a role in determining the value of subsurface pore space within the pa-
rameters of existing takings law.
Finally, in Part IV we consider a federal legislative proposal for
CCS that would be similar to that used for interstate natural gas pipelines
and natural gas storage under the Natural Gas Act. This adapted struc-
ture would require the government or CCS operators to negotiate with
surface owners or mineral rights owners if CCS operations physically in-
terfere with existing, protectable property interests (or if regulation rises
to the level of a taking) and if negotiations break down, that eminent
domain would be authorized as a public use to obtain the subsurface
pore space in question. Part IV first discusses why taking subsurface
property for CO2 sequestration to address climate change likely will be a
"public use" that authorizes the use of eminent domain under the U.S.
Constitution. It then provides some preliminary ideas on what this struc-
ture would look like and discusses the issue of how just compensation
and other statutory compensation to surface owners or mineral owners
could be implemented.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE, THE USE OF COAL, AND CCS
Concern over the potential effects of climate change continues to
grow, making the issue a major focus among policymakers, industry, and
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nonprofit organizations worldwide.20 Scientists have concluded that im-
mediate measures to control GHG emissions are necessary to avoid "se-
vere and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems," and that impacts of
climate change are likely to impose significant costs.21 These costs are re-
lated to potentially significant impacts on public health, agriculture, food
supply, forests, ecosystems, biodiversity, coastal zones, sea levels, water
resources, energy production and use, and public lands and recreation .22
The election of President Barack Obama has already brought about
significant changes in federal climate change policy. During the Bush
Administration, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) refused to take any major action with regard to GHG emissions
that would include mandatory caps on emissions, despite the growing
body of scientific evidence linking GHG emissions, particularly CO2
emissions, and climate change?3 This was true even after the Supreme
Court in 2007 directed the EPA to either regulate GHG emissions from
motor vehicles as an "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act (CAA) or
provide a reasonable explanation for failing to do so.24 During that time,
the EPA also refused to allow California to set its own more restrictive
limits on automobile tailpipe emissions to address climate change, as the
state is authorized to do if it receives a federal waiver from the EPA un-
der the CAA.1
20. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the term "climate change,"
which is often used synonymously with the term "global warming," refers to "any significant change in
measures of climate (such as temperature, precipitation, or wind) lasting for an extended period (dec-
ades or longer)." See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change, Basic Information,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter EPA, Basic
Information].
21. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (quoting MacCracken Decl. I 5(d)); Ri-
chard B. Alley et al., Summary for Policymakers, in IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 2-5, 10 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf [hereinafter WORKING GROUP 1 REPORT].
22. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change, Health and Environmental
Effects, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/index.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
23. Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 26 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 77, 82-84 (2007) (describing the federal government's lack of response to global warming); J.R.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1517 n.54 (2007) (describing state climate change initiatives as arising "against the
background of a relative vacuum of policy responses at the federal level" and detailing the Bush Ad-
ministration's policy positions on the issue); David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air:
The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1741-43 (2007) (describing
federal government's failure to take meaningful action with regard to climate change as compared to
the significant activity at the state and local levels).
24. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
25. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a
Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse
Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6,2008); John M. Broder
& Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17 States Can't Set Greenhouse Gas Rules for Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 2007, at Al (reporting on EPA's denial of California's CAA waiver request); Letter from Stephen
L. Johnson, U.S. Envtl. Protect. Agency, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007)
(informing California Governor of EPA's decision to deny California waiver request), http://www.
epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf.
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In January 2009, however, President Obama directed EPA Admin-
istrator Lisa Jackson to reconsider the Agency's prior decision denying
California's waiver request.26 At that time, at least seventeen states had
adopted or were considering adopting the California standards, which
would mean that granting the waiver would result in stricter limits on au-
to emissions in a significant portion of the country. 2" In April 2009, pur-
suant to the Supreme Court's 2007 directive in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
EPA issued a proposed "endangerment" finding under the CAA that
GHGs in the atmosphere, including C0 2, "threaten the public health and
welfare of current and future generations. '28  Then, in May 2009, Presi-
dent Obama announced that the Administration had reached an agree-
ment with the auto industry, the State of California, and other stake-
holders for setting new national auto emission standards that will
increase fuel economy and impose the first-ever national greenhouse gas
emission standards on cars and trucks.29 Moreover, as part of the effort
to address climate change, the economic stimulus package enacted in
February 2009 contains $80 billion in spending and tax incentives for re-
newable energy, energy efficiency, and new coal and fossil fuel technolo-
gies. 30  While it remains to be seen what the new climate change and
energy policies will actually look like, the Administration's focus on cli-
mate change, renewable energy, and more environmentally friendly ap-
proaches to the use of existing fossil fuels is significant.
One important piece of the Administration's plan to change the way
we generate energy and deal with the associated emissions is the devel-
opment of CCS technology. Energy Secretary Steven Chu has stated
that developing CCS technology "is critically important for reducing
26. Ken Bensinger & Jim Tankersley, Obama Makes Move on Emissions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2009, at Al; see also Editorial, New Day on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A30.
27. Bensinger & Tankersley, supra note 26.
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF EPA's PROPOSED ENDANGERMENT AND
CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDINGS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (Apr. 17,
2009), http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/downloads/Determination.pdf" The EPA issued
the final endangerment findings in December 2009. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Find-
ings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Endangerment and
Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
29. See U.S. ENvTL. PROTECT. AGENCY, EPA WILL PROPOSE HISTORIC GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLES (May 2009), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/
regulations/420f09028.pdf; Colin Sullivan, Vow of Silence Key to White House-Calif. Fuel Economy
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/05/2O2Ogreenwire-vow-of-
silence-key-to-white-house-calif-fuel-e-12208.htmil; Press Release, White House, President Obama
Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/President-Obama-Announces-Nationa-Fue-Efficiency-Plicy/; Josh Voorhees &
Robin Bravender, Obama Unveils Dual Standard for Fuel Economy, Emissions, GREENWIRE, May 19,
2009, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/05/19/1. The EPA granted California's waiver request
on June 30, 2009, but because the new federal standards are substantially similar to the California
standards, California agreed to defer to the national standards through 2016. News Release, U.S.
Envtl. Protect. Agency, EPA Grants California GHG Waiver (June 30, 2009) (EPA news releases are
available on its Web site, http://www.epa.gov/newsroon/newsreleases.htm).
30. See supra note 2.
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greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. and around the world," and the
Department of Energy (DOE) has committed billions of dollars to CCS
research and development.31 While the individual technologies in CCS
are well understood, there are few commercial-scale integrated projects
operating, none of which capture CO 2 from power plants, and the tech-
nology is prohibitively expensive without a significant price on CO2 emis-
sions.32 However, the promise of CCS is that, under the appropriate
conditions, it can allow society to dramatically reduce CO2 emissions
while still using inexpensive fossil fuels.33 This Part discusses the poten-
tial role of CCS in combating climate change by significantly reducing
CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants. Section A explains the cur-
rent role of coal in providing electricity in the United States and world-
wide and introduces the arguments for and against CCS as a means of
continuing to use coal while reducing its harmful climate effects. Section
B explains more precisely how CCS technology works, how it has been
implemented to date, and the potential risks associated with CCS. Last,
Section C explores how CCS implementation may come into conflict
with existing subsurface property rights and surveys existing federal and
state legislation on that topic to date.
A. Electric Power, Industrial Sources, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Any potential solution to address climate change must include re-
ducing GHG emissions from the electric power and industrial sectors.
The U.S. electric power sector was responsible for roughly 42 percent of
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and 34 percent of total GHG
emissions in the United States in 2007.14 Almost 80 percent of the 2.4 bil-
lion metric tons of GHG emissions associated with the electric power
sector each year are from coal-fired electric plants.35 Coal-fired electric
power plants play an important role in our energy infrastructure, provid-
ing inexpensive base-load electricity generation3 6 that amounts to roughly
31. See Steven D. Cook, Carbon Capture, Storage to Get $2.4 Billion in Recovery Funds, Secre-
tary Chu Announces, 40 Env't Rept. 1164 (BNA) (May 22, 2009); Bob Secter, New Life for Clean-Coal
Plan, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2009, at 4 (discussing Department of Energy's commitment to CCS as well
as its decision to revive the "FutureGen" project which the Bush Administration had canceled based
on alleged cost overruns that a congressional auditor later said were based on false projections).
32. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: FULL-SCALE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRESS UPDATE 3-4 (2009), http://www.iea.org/G8/docs/ccsg8julyO9.pdf.
33. Id.
34. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990-2007, at ES-9, ES-16 (2009), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads09/
GHG2007entire-report-508.pdf.
35. DEP'T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY, CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE
GENERATION OF ELECTRIC POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2000), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/
electricity/page/co2_report/co2emiss.pdf.
36. Electricity cannot be stored and must be generated to meet demand. Because electricity
demand varies both throughout the day and across different seasons, plants typically are run as either
base load or peaking plants. Base load generating plants are plants that run almost continuously.
Typically, base load plants-traditionally nuclear or coal-are inexpensive to operate, but more ex-
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half the total U.S. generation.17 Coal resources are plentiful in the Unit-
ed States38 and worldwide, 39 and coal is inexpensive relative to other fuel
sources.40 Coal is a key energy resource in countries like China, India,
South Africa, and Germany, as well as in the United States.4 1
Despite the Obama Administration's focus on climate change, 42 the
fact remains that GHG emissions continue to increase as much of the
growing global energy demand is satisfied with coal-based electric power.
Currently the United States emits roughly two billion tons of CO 2 per
year from coal combustion in electric power plants.43  Fossil fuels are
predicted to remain a "mainstay" in energy production in the U.S. and
around the world for decades to come, thereby steadily increasing at-
mospheric concentrations of CO2." More important, putting aside the
use of coal-fired electric power in the United States, rapid growth in de-
veloping countries, particularly China and India, is significantly escalat-
ing CO 2 emissions. 45 Indeed, by 2030, the combined coal consumption of
China and India is expected to account for nearly 70 percent of the in-
cremental demand worldwide.46
Effectively dealing with climate change will require a fundamental
transition in how societies throughout the world produce and use energy.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that stabilizing atmospheric con-
centrations of GHGs is fundamentally different than stabilizing concen-
trations of traditional criteria air pollutants like sulfur dioxide (SO2) or
oxides of nitrogen (NO.). 47  Most GHGs have long atmospheric life-
pensive to build. See generally Stratford Douglas, Measuring Gains from Regional Dispatch: Coal-
Fired Power Plant Utilization and Market Reforms, 27 ENERGY J. 119 (2006).
37. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NET GENERATION BY ENERGY SOURCE (2009), http://www.
eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/tablel-l.html (ranging from 49 percent to 53 percent in the years
beginning with 1995 and ending with 2007).
38. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Explained, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/
energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal-reserves (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).
39. Coal reserves are especially prominent in North America, Europe, and Asia. See BRITISH
PETROLEUM, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 32 (2009), http://www.bp.com/liveassets/
bp-internet/globalbp/globalbp-uk-english/reports -and-publications/statistical energy.review-2008/S
TAGING/local-assets/2009-downloads/statistical-review-of-world-energy-fu 
-report_- 2009.pdf.
40. For a good summary of the above sources, see ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY
REVIEW 2008 (2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf. Compare U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration, Petroleum Price & Data Analysis, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet-pri
top.asp (last visited Dec. 15, 2009), with U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal News and
Markets, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/coalnews/coalmar.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
41. See BRITISH PETROLEUM, supra note 39, at 35.
42. See Press Release, Barack Obama, President, Statement by the President on House Passage
of the American Clean Energy and Security Act (June 26, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/Statement-By-The-President-On-House-Passage-Of-The-American-Clean-
Energy-And-Security-Act.
43. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY, supra note 34, at 3-5 tbl.3-5.
44. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for Car-
bon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,491, 43,495 (proposed July 25,
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146) [hereinafter EPA Proposed Rule].
45. See MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL 17 (2007), http://web.mit/edu/coalThe-
Future of Coal.pdf.
46. See id. at 63.
47. See generally Rubin et al., supra note 12, at 20.
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times-decades to thousands of years-compared to hours or days for
most criteria air pollutants.48 According to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, deep GHG emissions reduc-
tions-roughly 50 to 80 percent below 2000 levels49-will be necessary to
stabilize atmospheric concentrations of GHG at 450 to 490 parts-per-
million and, hopefully, avoid some of the most dangerous impacts from
climate change.5"
While many energy technologies are available to make near-term
reductions in GHG emissions, it will be necessary to deploy a full portfo-
lio of all available low-carbon technologies to address the immense scale
of the cuts required to combat climate change." CCS is emerging as a
potentially promising but potentially contentious technology that could
enable the continued use of fossil fuels while still allowing society to
dramatically reduce accompanying GHG emissions. This technology
could be deployed to reduce CO 2 emissions from upstream natural gas
processing, industrial operations, and, importantly, coal-fired electric
generation.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published
a comprehensive report on CCS technology in 2005.52 This report out-
lines sources of CO2,53 capture technologies, 54 transportation modes,55 and
48. Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases.
Piers Forster et al., Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Force, in WORKING GROUP
1 REPORT, supra note 21, at 129, 212 tbl.2.14, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-
wgl-chapter2.pdf; EPA, Basic Information, supra note 20.
49. See Terry Barker et al., Summary for Policymakers, in IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT:
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 15 tbl.SPM.5 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-spm.pdf.
50. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, opened for signature
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf ("The ultimate
objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may
adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame suffi-
cient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."). The United
States is a signatory to the UNFCCC, but not to the later Kyoto Protocol, which establishes targets for
GHG emission reductions.
51. See, e.g., ENERGY TECH. ASSESSMENT CTR., ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE POWER TO
REDUCE CO2 EMISSIONS: THE FULL PORTFOLIO 2009, at 5-1 (2009), available at http://my.epri.com/
portal/server.pt?Abstractid000000000001020389; James A. Edmonds et al., Modeling Greenhouse
Gas Energy Technology Responses to Climate Change, 29 ENERGY 1529, 1531 (2004); Stephen Pacala
& Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Cur-
rent Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968,969-71 (2004).
52. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE, supra note 7. The
IPCC is a scientific body created under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme
and the World Meteorological Organization to provide scientific, technical, and socioeconomic infor-
mation on climate change for policymakers. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Organ-
ization, http://www.ipcc.ch/organizationlorganization.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
53. John Gale et al., Sources of C0 2, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE
AND STORAGE, supra note 7, at 75, 75-103.
54. Kelly Thambimuthu et al., Capture of CO, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE
CAPTURE AND STORAGE, supra note 7, at 105, 105-78.
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geologic sequestration and risks;56 covers economic potential and cost; 7
and describes how CCS could fit within a larger GHG reduction effort.5 8
Ultimately, it concludes that CCS could play a significant role in lowering
the overall costs of deep emissions reductions. 9
B. CCS Technology
CCS technology assembles existing technologies that have been de-
veloped within the chemical, oil, and natural gas industries to capture
and sequester large volumes of C0 2 60 CCS involves capturing CO2 dur-
ing fossil fuel use,6" transporting the CO2 to a location with suitable geo-
logic formations (typically by pipeline), and injecting the CO2 into deep
geologic formations at least one kilometer below the surface.62 The goal
is to avoid the atmospheric release of CO2 by sequestering the captured
CO2 emissions deep underground for hundreds to thousands of years.
CO 2 sequestration could take place in depleted oil or gas fields, saline
formations, and, potentially, deep coal seams.63 During CO2 injection,
the pressure of CO 2 at the well bottom exceeds the pressure of fluid in
the formation, and CO 2 is forced into microscopic spaces in the rock ma-
trix, displacing brine (or oil and gas) that originally occupied the pore
space. 64 CO2 will flow through and fill the pore spaces in permeable lay-
ers of the rock and be prevented from migrating upwards by less perme-
able rock layers. 65 CO2 will typically be sequestered as a dense, supercrit-
ical fluid.66 While CO2 density depends on the reservoir temperature and
pressure, in almost all circumstances (except deep ocean subsurface se-
55. Richard Doctor et al., Transport of C0 2, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE
CAPTURE AND STORAGE, supra note 7, at 179, 179-93.
56. Benson et al., supra note 7, at 195-276.
57. Howard Herzog et al., Cost and Economic Potential, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON
DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE, supra note 7, at 339, 339-62.
58. Balgis Osman-Elasha et al., Implications of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage for Green-
house Gas Inventories and Accounting, in IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE
AND STORAGE, supra note 7, at 363, 363-79.
59. Herzog et al.,supra note 57, at 341.
60. Rubin et al., supra note 12, at 40-41.
61. The CCS process could also be applied to other industrial processes that have CO2 emissions
streams, like ethanol plants or other industrial facilities. We focus on fossil fuel operations here be-
cause they are critical to any climate change effort.
62. See Doctor et al., supra note 55, at 181; Rubin et al., supra note 12, at 17, 31-36; see also Sam
Holloway, An Overview of the Underground Disposal of Carbon Dioxide, 38 ENERGY CONVERSION &
MGMT. S193, S193 (Supp. 1997); Sam Holloway, Storage of Fossil Fuel-Derived Carbon Dioxide Be-
neath the Surface of the Earth, 26 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 145, 149 (2001) [hereinafter Holloway,
Storage of Fossil Fuel-Derived Carbon Dioxide].
63. See Holloway, Storage of Fossil Fuel-Derived Oriented Carbon Dioxide, supra note 62, at
148-49, 158.
64. Id. at 149-50.
65. Id. at 150.
66. A supercritical fluid exists when a substance is above its critical temperature and critical
pressure. When a fluid is at its critical point, it exists as a gas and liquid in equilibrium, giving it unique
properties. CO2 is considered a supercritical fluid at temperatures greater than 31.1 degrees Celsius
and 7.38 MPa (critical point). See CRC HANDBOOK OF CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 6-39 (David R. Lide
ed., 88th ed. 2008).
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questration, not discussed here) CO2 will be less dense than the brine
present in the reservoir. 67
Because injected CO 2 will initially be more buoyant than the brine
in the geological formation, injected CO 2 will have the tendency to move
upwards and spread laterally within the subsurface. 68  This behavior is
important when considering subsurface property rights. Due to differ-
ences in site geology, subsurface CO 2 will behave differently at different
sites. Importantly, after injection of CO 2 ceases, CO2 trapped in the rock
matrix will gradually become less mobile and more secure as CO2 dis-
solved in the brine and slow geochemical reactions convert it to minerals
like calcium carbonate. 69 Thus, an effective geologic sequestration site
will keep large volumes of a buoyant fluid underground for centuries to
millennia, effectively occupying the pore space in perpetuity.
Natural geologic analogs, such as geologic formations containing
crude oil, natural gas, and CO2 prove that CO 2 can be retained under-
ground for millions of years.70 CCS technologies would attempt to take
advantage of this geologic capacity to reduce CO 2 emissions to the at-
mosphere. Several CCS projects are underway in Norway, Algeria, and
Canada, and more are planned in the United States, China, Australia,
and other European countries. 71 There are currently four active CCS
projects, each injecting roughly one million metric tons of CO2 peryear. 72
For example, the Dakota Gasification Company plant in Beulah, North
Dakota captures and transports CO 2 by pipeline over 200 miles across an
international border to the Canadian Weyburn oil field for enhanced oil
recovery. 73 The DOE has funded seven regional carbon sequestration
partnerships with the aim of long-term research and development of the
technology as well as six of seven anticipated large scale pilot projects to
store 1 million tons or more of CO2 in various geologic formations across
67. See Stefan Bachu, Sequestration of CO2 in Geological Media: Criteria and Approach for Site
Selection in Response to Climate Change, 41 ENERGY CONVERSION & MGMT. 953, 957 (2000); Rubin
et al., supra note 12, at 31.
68. Rubin et al., supra note 12, at 31-32.
69. William D. Gunter et al., The Role of Hydrogeological and Geothermal Trapping in Sedimen-
tary Basins for Secure Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, in GEOLOGICAL STORAGE OF CARBON
DIOXIDE 129, 135-36 (S. J. Baines & R. H. Worden eds., 2004) (asserting that mineralization with car-
bonates take just days where the same with silicates can take hundreds to thousands of years); Karsten
Pruess et al., Numerical Modeling of Aquifer Disposal of C0 2, 8 Soc'y PETROLEUM ENGINEERS J. 49,
52-53 (2003).
70. See Gunter et al., supra note 69, at 135.
71. See Rubin et al., supra note 12, at 19,33 tbl.TS.5.
72. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 32, at 4-5. Three current CCS projects capture and
inject the CO2 produced from natural gas production projects. Sleipner in the North Sea and Snovhit
in the Barents Sea injects CO2 captured from produced natural gas deep below the seafloor. Id. at 5.
In Salah, in Algeria, injects the captured CO 2 into a deep gas formation. Id. The third project, in
Saskatchewan, injects and monitors CO2 for the Weyburn enhanced oil recovery project in Beulah,
North Dakota. Id.
73. See id.; see also Dakota Gasification Company, Pipeline Information, http://www.dakotagas.
com/CO2_Capture-and-Storage/Pipeline -Information/index.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2009); Interna-
tional Energy Agency, CO2 Capture and Storage, R, D & D Projects Database, http://www.
co2captureandstorage.info/project-specific.php?projectid=119 (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
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the country. 74 As mentioned earlier, the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act will provide an additional $3.4 billion for CCS demonstra-
tion projects, increasing federal support for CCS by 70 percent to over $8
billion.75  A DOE report estimates that geological resources are likely
sufficient to allow sequestration of more than 3300 billion metric tons of
CO2 from power plants and other industrial sources across the U.S. and
Canada.76 Thus, the available sequestration capacity could prove to be
quite large when compared with the two billion tons of CO2 emitted from
coal-fired power plants annually in the United States.7  Some electric
power industry representatives believe that CCS "could reduce power
plant emissions by about one-quarter in 2030."17
Although the idea of injecting CO2 into the subsurface for the pur-
pose of controlling GHG emissions may be new, the practice of injecting
CO 2 into the subsurface for other purposes is not. For decades, oil pro-
ducers have injected CO2 into the subsurface to increase oil production.
This process, known as "enhanced oil recovery" or EOR, is in wide-
spread use in the Permian Basin in western Texas, where approximately
30 million tons of CO 2 are injected into the ground annually, resulting in
a total of 600 million tons injected-though not formally "seques-
tered"-in that area since 1985.79 These amounts, however, pale in com-
parison to the massive scale of injection required to implement CCS for
climate change purposes, foreshadowing the property rights issues asso-
ciated with CCS. 80 Indeed, for CCS to have a real impact on climate
change, individual projects must sequester millions of tons of CO 2 per
74. U.S. Department of Energy, Fossil Energy, Carbon Sequestration Regional Partnerships,
http://fossil.energy.gov/sequestration/partnerships/index.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
75. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 15 (2007), http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon-seq/refshelf/atlas/ATLAS.pdf; Law-
rence J. Speer, DOE Finds Large Capacity for Storing Carbon Dioxide Across U.S, Canada, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at A-5 (Mar. 29, 2007); see also Eric Williams et al., Carbon Capture, Pipe-
line and Storage: A Viable Option for North Carolina Utilities? (Nicolas Inst. for Envtl. Pol'y Solutions
& Ctr. on Global Change, Duke Univ. Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007), http:\\www.nicholas.duke.
edu/institute/carboncapture.pdf.
77. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 9, at 112; see also EPA Proposed Rule, supra note 44, at
43,496 ("Worldwide, there appears to be significant capacity in subsurface formations both on land
and under the seafloor to sequester CO 2 for hundreds, if not thousands of years.").
78. Steven D. Cook, Power Industry Officials Disagree on Future, Feasibility of Carbon Capture,
Storage, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at A-1 (Sept. 26, 2007).
79. RICHARD C. MAXWELL ET AL., THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 13-14 (8th ed. 2007) (discussing
enhanced recovery technology); Steven D. Cook, Researchers Optimistic on Prospects for Successful
Carbon Capture, Storage, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at A-1 (May 16,2007) (discussing the use of
enhanced oil recovery in Texas as a current example of subsurface injection of CO2); see also Memo-
randum from Cynthia C. Dougherty, Dir., Office of Ground Water & Drinking Water, and Brian
McLean, Dir., Office of Atmospheric Programs, to the Water Mgmt. Div. Dirs. & Air Div. Dirs. of
EPA Regions I to X (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/guide uic
carbonsequestration-final-03-07.pdf. ("While injection of fluids, including CO 2 into the subsurface,
e.g., for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and enhanced gas recovery (EGR), is a long-standing practice,
injection of CO2 for [CCS] is an experimental application of this existing technology.").
80. MASS. INST. TECH., supra note 46, at ix ("If 60% of the CO2 produced from U.S. coal-based
power generation were to be captured and compressed to a liquid for geologic sequestration, its vol-
ume would about equal the total U.S. oil consumption of 20 million barrels per day.").
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year and keep the injected CO 2 underground for hundreds to thousands
of years. Depending on the formation geology and the depth and per-
meability of the injection zone, sequestered CO2 from a single project
could potentially spread over tens to hundreds of square kilometers, and
subsurface pressure effects- affecting brine displacement -could be felt
over even greater distances."t
Despite its significant potential to have a real impact on climate
change, like any technology, CCS is not without risks. These include the
risks to human health and the environment associated with the unin-
tended release of CO 2 during transportation by pipeline to sequestration
sites, injection of CO2 into the subsurface, or leakage of CO 2 to the sur-
face or into overlying sources of drinking water.82 These risks can arise
from problems associated with improper transportation, leaking wells,
unanticipated issues with the subsurface geology in which CO2 is injected,
or a failure to properly monitor and manage CO 2 once it is injected into
the subsurface. s3 There are also climate risks associated with CCS. If
CCS becomes a part of forthcoming state or federal CO2 cap-and-trade
systems, incorporating CCS into industrial operations will result in cre-
dits for reducing CO2 through CCS technology. 4 It is very possible,
however, that if significant quantities of CO2 injected into the subsurface
prematurely leak back into the atmosphere, it could limit the long-term
climate benefit.5
CCS has both its detractors and supporters within the environmen-
tal nonprofit community. Greenpeace released a report in May 2008 en-
titled "False Hope," in which it contends that CCS wastes energy, creates
unacceptable risks of leakage, is too expensive, undermines funding for
more sustainable solutions to potential climate change, carries significant
liability risks, and cannot be implemented in time to avoid dangerous
climate change. 86 Greenpeace argues instead for investing in renewable
energy technologies and increasing energy efficiency that can begin to
reverse climate change today.87 Other environmental nonprofit groups,
however, such as the Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources
Defense Council, World Resources Institute, and The Nature Conser-
vancy, see CCS as a necessary technology to help mitigate the effects of
81. Pruess et al., supra note 69, at 52-53.
82. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 9, at 117-19 (discussing risks to human health and the envi-
ronment associated with the release of CO2 from CCS projects). With regard to property rights, CCS-
related risks include hydrocarbon contamination and potential water degradation.
83. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Identify-
ing and Managing Risks, 8 ISSUES L. SCHOLARSHIP 1, 1 (2009).
84. Id. at 27-28.
85. Id. at 1-2.
86. See GREENPEACE, FALSE HOPE: WHY CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE WON'T SAVE THE
CLIMATE 5 (2008).
87. Id.
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climate change.8 As one environmental nonprofit representative has
stated, CCS "is a terrible idea that we desperately need." 89 Outside the
environmental nonprofit community there is an equally significant range
of views on the merits of CCS. Those who deny the fact of climate
change may see CCS and other climate change technologies as an un-
necessary expenditure of government and private resources. 90 Some in
industry view CCS as a way to acknowledge the problem of climate
change while allowing the world to continue to use coal long into the fu-
ture.9 Others see it as a transition technology that allows the world to
make dramatic reductions in CO2 emissions-and broker politically via-
ble climate agreements-while alternatives to coal and fossil fuels are
developed. 2 Yet others oppose CCS because of potential risks to human
health and the environment, the moral and ethical issues associated with
injecting pollutants into the earth, and the fact that CCS enables the con-
tinued use of coal and may reduce the incentives and funding needed to
transition to a more sustainable energy future.93
Our objective in this Article is not to argue in favor of or against the
development of CCS as a technology to reduce GHG emissions in re-
sponse to climate change. We recognize that the position one takes on a
range of CCS-related issues-from property rights, to takings, to who
should be responsible for the risks associated with CCS-depends signif-
icantly on whether one wants to encourage or discourage the develop-
ment of CCS as a temporary or permanent solution to climate change.
Our goal here is to illustrate a range of approaches available to address
the subsurface property rights issues CCS raises and discuss the policy
implications that flow from them. As a result, the remainder of this Ar-
ticle explores how CCS may intersect with existing interests in subsurface
property, as well as methods policymakers and courts may employ to re-
solve any conflicts.
C. Potential Intersection of CCS and Subsurface Property Rights
For CCS to enable continued use of fossil fuels and simultaneous
deep emission reductions, it must be widely deployed. To do this, the
technology must be integrated into a larger industrial, legal, and regula-
tory scheme. Of key import are (1) the amount of the CO2 to be in-
jected-a 1000 megawatt coal-fired power plant produces roughly four-
88. Gabrielle Wong-Parodi et al., Environmental Non-Government Organizations' Perceptions of
Geologic Sequestration, ENVTL. RESEARCH LETrERS, at 1, 3 tbl.3 Apr.-June 2008, http://www.iop.org/
EJ/abstract/1748-9326/3/2/0240071.
89. Id. at 3.
90. See, e.g., Nicholas Dawidoff, The Civil Heretic, N.Y. TiMES MAG.. Mar. 29. 2009, at 32 (profil-
ing Institute for Advanced Study physicist Freeman Dyson, who has voiced doubts about both climate
change and its potential for significant adverse effects on the planet).
91. See Wong-Parodi, supra note 88, at 4.
92. See id. at 5-6.
93. See id. at 5.
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to-six million tons of CO2 per year; (2) the size of the area injected CO2
will occupy-tens to hundreds of square kilometers; (3) the fact that CO 2
will migrate in the subsurface and initially be more buoyant than the sub-
surface saline formation water; and (4) the need for injected CO 2 to re-
main in the subsurface for hundreds to thousands of years, effectively oc-
cupying the subsurface pore space in perpetuity.
Other economic uses of the subsurface-water recovery, hydrocar-
bon production, natural gas storage, or liquid waste disposal-could
coincide with subsurface CCS injection.94 Throughout the United States,
subsurface activities vary extensively, as do depths of other economic in-
terests and target CCS formations. Every CCS injection site will be geo-
logically unique, and establishing an effective monitoring program will
vary across geologic formations and across sites within a particular for-
mation. Indeed, state legislators, particularly in oil and gas producing
states, are attempting to write CCS legislation that best avoids conflict
with other productive subsurface activities. 9
As an initial matter, subsurface formations with hydrocarbon reser-
voirs are often already well-characterized, 6 and are often stacked be-
tween non-hydrocarbon bearing saline formations. 97 Currently oil and
natural gas developers operate wells at average depths of 1720 and 1750
meters (5600 and 5700 feet), respectively, which is similar to the depths
of potential CO2 sequestration projects.98 The possibility of developing a
CO 2 sequestration site above or below oil or natural gas reservoirs may
have advantages in reduced characterization and capital costs, but may
also create potential interference between projects.99 The potential sub-
surface impacts of CO2 injection are varied. In a reservoir with active
hydrocarbon resources, particularly natural gas, migrating CO 2 could
comingle directly with the resource and require additional removal ef-
forts. 10° Soluble CO 2 can cause the precipitation of carbonate minerals
and associated plugging of pore space, potentially affecting the extraction
94. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAMEWORK FOR GEOLOGICAL
CARBON SEQUESTRATION ON PUBLIC LAND 1 (June 3, 2009), http://www.doi.gov/news/09_News-
Releases/EISA Sec. 714_Report to Congress V12-Final.pdf ("[C]arbon sequestration may poten-
tially conflict with other land uses including existing and future mines, oil and gas fields, coal re-
sources, geothermal fields, and drinking water sources.").
95. April Reese, Climate: States Moving to Clarify Landowners' Rights over CO 2 Storage Space,
LAND LETTER, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.eenews.net (subscription required for access) (noting that
some states are also trying to write clauses in the legislation that protect existing resources and proper-
ty interests); see also infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (discussing state legislation).
96. See, e.g., Christine Doughty & Karsten Pruess, Modeling Supercritical Carbon Dioxide Injec-
tion in Heterogeneous Porous Media, 3 VADOSE ZONE J. 837 (2004).
97. Carl L. Brassow, Use of Solution-Mined Salt Caverns for the Disposal of Non-Hazardous
Oil and Gas (NOW) Waste (Nov. 2001), http://ipec.utulsa.edu/Conf2001/brasso2_131.pdf.
98. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Average Depths of Crude Oil and Natural Gas
Wells, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet-crd-welldep sl-a.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
99. See Benson et al., supra note 7, at 234 (stating that the presence of CO 2 in the basin can lead
to corrosion problems and can change the composition of oils such that plugging, erosion, and
processing problems arise).
100. See id.
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efficiency for existing natural gas facilities.101 The pressure effects from
the injection operation, particularly if multiple sites are used to inject
CO 2 into a single basin, could adversely impact other injection operations
by potentially altering injectibility, plume size and shape, and associated
monitoring changes. 102
Hydrocarbon extraction also produces large amounts of waste water
that needs to be disposed. When oil is produced it is mixed with water
(an average of seven gallons of water produced for each gallon of oil),
and the produced water must be separated and disposed of, usually by
underground injection.103 In the United States each year, over 750 billion
gallons of oil-produced waters"1' are injected into the subsurface through
150,000 disposal wells. 10 5 This volume of produced water corresponds to
roughly the volume that two gigatonnes (Gt) of CO 2 would occupy at one
kilometer depth, potentially requiring coordination with future CO2 se-
questration operations. 106 The waste water is generally handled on site,
with roughly one-quarter of it being injected back into the oil producing
formation, in part to help in the oil recovery process. I 1 Other operators
inject into non-producing formations at varying depths where porous and
permeable formations are present."8 Some waste water disposal wells
inject below the hydrocarbon formation and others inject above it.109 In
Texas, produced water is injected into non-producing formations varying
in depth from approximately 300 to 3000 meters (1000 to 10,000 feet),
with 60 percent of these wells a kilometer or more deep.10 Both the
practice and scale of handling produced water are similar to the expected
practices for injecting CO. 111
Underground natural gas storage is another area where CCS use of
the subsurface may require coordination. Underground natural gas sto-
rage has helped balance supply and demand fluctuations around the
globe for nearly 100 years and, in many ways, is a useful analog for se-
101. Sally M. Benson & David R. Cole, CO2 Sequestration in Deep Sedimentary Formations, 4
ELEMENTS 325, 328 (2008); see also Gunter et al., supra note 69, at 136-38.
102. SARAH FORBES ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., CCS GUIDELINES 62-63 (2008), http://pdf.wri.
org/ccs-guidelines.pdf; JOHN VEIL ET AL., ARGONNE NAT'L LAB., A WHITE PAPER DESCRIBING
PRODUCED WATER FROM PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND COAL BED METHANE
17 (2004), http://www.ead.anl.gov/pub/docProducedWatersWPO40l.pdf.
103. VEIL ET AL., supra note 102, at 47.
104. Produced water is the industry term for brine that is extracted as part of oil or gas produc-
tion.
105. Benson et al., supra note 7, at 212; see also M. G. PUDER & J. A. VEIL, ARGONNE NAT'L
LAB., OFFSITE COMMERCIAL DISPOSAL OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION WASTE:
AVAILABILITY, OPTIONS, AND COSTS 39 (2006), http://www.evs.anl.gov/pub/doc/ANL-EVS-R-06-
5.pdf.
106. Benson et al., supra note 7, at 212.
107. See VEIL ET AL., supra note 102, at 49.
108. See id. at 49-50.
109. See id. at 34.
110. Melisa Pollak, Produced Water Disposal: Comparison to Geological Sequestration of CO2 1
n.3 (Jan. 29,2009) (on file with authors).
111. Benson et al., supra note 7, at 234.
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questration of CO 2." 2 Similar to sequestration of CO 2, depleted hydro-
carbon fields and saline aquifer formations are commonly used for natu-
ral gas storage."3 Because injected CO2 is readily mixed with natural gas,
if natural gas storage and CO2 sequestration projects operated in close
proximity within the same basin, the two substances might comingle and
degrade the quality of the natural gas."4 Today there are roughly 133
operators storing between 1200 and 3300 billion cubic feet (BCF) of nat-
ural gas through a series of roughly 300,000 wells in the United States."5
In addition, long-standing and new uses of the subsurface for activi-
ties wholly unrelated to hydrocarbon production may take place in for-
mations and depths similar to CO2 sequestration. EPA Underground In-
jection Control (UIC) Program Class I waste injection wells, for
example, aim to inject waste below the lowest underground source of
drinking water."6 These waste injection wells are located in basins where
the freshwater is protected from the injection zone by an impermeable
caprock or confining layer, much like what would be used for CO 2 se-
questration."7 Injection zones typically range from slightly over 500 me-
ters to more than 3000 meters in depth." 8 There are roughly 550 Class I
wells in the United States, mostly located in the sedimentary basins of
the Gulf Coast and Great Lakes regions." 9 While approximately 48 per-
cent of the Class I wells are for nonhazardous waste, another 30 percent
of the wells are dedicated to municipal wastewater disposal in Florida. 120
The EPA recently changed its guidelines for Class I wells for Florida
wastewater to prevent adverse effects from the noticeable upward migra-
tion of the disposed waters into underground sources of drinking wa-
ter.
2
'
Finally, compressed air storage and aquifer storage and recovery
have both become increasingly attractive technologies that use the sub-
surface. Compressed air storage could help manage complications with
the intermittency of large-scale wind produced energy. Wind energy that
112. Id. at 211.
113. Id.
114. Bachu, supra note 67, at 964.
115. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report, http://www.
eia.doe.gov/oil-gas/natural-gas/ngs/ngs.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2009) (follow the "History" hyper-
link); William Trapmann, U.S. Weekly Natural Gas Storage Data, slide 4 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oilgas/natural-gas/presentations/2007/ngsdata/ngsdata-files/frame.html.
116. VEIL ET AL., supra note 102, at 34.
117. For a discussion of the EPA's UIC Program, see infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
118. U.S. ENVT'L PROTECT. AGENCY, CLASS I UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL PROGRAM:
STUDY OF THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CLASS I UNDERGROUND INJECTION WELLS 12 (2001),
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdwOOOluiclpdfs/study-uic-classl-study-risks-classl.pdf.
119. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Industrial & Municipal Waste Disposal Wells (Class
I), http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/wells classl.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
120. Id.
121. See Underground Injection Control Program-Revision to the Federal Underground Injec-
tion Control Requirements for Class I Municipal Disposal Wells in Florida, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,513 (Nov.
22,2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 146 (2005)); David W. Keith et al., Regulating the Underground Injec-
tion of CO,, 39 ENVTL. SCi. & TECH. 499A, 501A (2005).
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would otherwise flow to the electric grid would be used to compress air
that would then be pumped and stored in deep geologic reservoirs for
later use in making natural gas turbines more efficient. 122 A compressed
air storage operation in Germany has been compressing roughly 300,000
cubic meters of air in a natural gas storage reservoir roughly 650 to 800
meters below the surface.'23 Additionally, the Battelle Memorial Insti-
tute has suggested that future United States compressed air storage
projects should be located in formations roughly 650 to 850 meters below
the surface and at least 100 meters away from any dissimilar geologic
formation.124 Aquifer storage and recovery involves injecting water into
deep underground reservoirs for later retrieval. 25 The subsurface forma-
tion essentially acts as a "water bank" for future withdrawals.
Thus, there is the real potential for CCS operations to interfere with
actual or reasonably foreseeable uses of subsurface pore space and, con-
sequently, subsurface property rights. Currently, there is little federal or
state statutory authority governing subsurface property rights issues in
the context of CCS, and many of these activities are managed within dif-
ferent federal and state agencies. The federal Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA) gives the EPA authority to manage the UIC program, which
regulates underground injection activities and enhanced oil recovery but
not natural gas storage.26 The EPA has determined that its authority
under the UIC program confers the authority to regulate geologic se-
questration of C02 127 In July 2008, the EPA released for comment a
draft CCS-specific rule under the UIC program.' The proposed rule in-
cludes provisions for on-site characterization, well construction and op-
eration, post-injection monitoring, and post-closure care.129 The EPA has
stated, however, that the SDWA does not give the agency any authority
to address CCS-specific property rights concerns, and thus these issues
are not addressed by the new rule.3 0
Recently, several states have also begun to develop regulatory
frameworks to manage geologic sequestration of C0 2, with increasing at-
122. See Paul Denholm & Ramteen Sioshansi, The Value of Compressed Air Energy Storage with
Wind in Transmission-Constrained Electric Power Systems, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 3149,3149-50 (2009).
123. See Fritz Crotogino et al., Huntorf CA ES: More than 20 Years of Successful Operation (Mar.
22, 2009), http://www.uni-saarland.de/fak7/fze/AKEArchiv/AKE2003H/AKE2003HVortraege/
AKE2003HO3cCrotogino eaHuntorfCAESCompressedAirEnergyStorage.pdf.
124. R. D. ALLEN ET AL., BATELLE MEMORIAL INST., GEOTECHNICAL ISSUES AND GUIDELINES
FOR STORAGE OF COMPRESSED AIR IN EXCAVATED HARD ROCK CAVERNS, at xiii (1982), http://www.
osti.gov/energycitations/servlets/purl/5437632-pQfu9J/5437632.pdf.
125. State of Washington Department of Ecology, Aquifer Storage and Recovery, http://www.
ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/asr/asr-home.htn-l (last visited Dec. 22, 2009).
126. 40 C.F.R. §§ 144-146 (2008).
127. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(h)(d) (2006); see also U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Underground Injection Control Program, http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/uictwells-
sequestration.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
128. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for Car-
bon Dioxide (CO 2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492 (proposed July 25, 2008).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 43,495.
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tention to the issue of pore space ownership. As shown in Table 1,
Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota have passed legislation explicitly
defining pore space ownership.131 Wyoming H.B. 89 addresses property
rights by stating that "[t]he ownership of all pore space in all strata below
the surface lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the
several owners of the surface above the strata. 13 2 In 2009, the Wyoming
governor signed into law H.B. 57, which amends the pore space provision
in H.B. 89 and clarifies that the mineral estate is still dominant over the
surface estate.'33 In 2009, North Dakota S.B. 2139 similarly proclaimed
that "[t]itle to pore space in all strata underlying the surface of lands and
waters is vested in the owner of the overlying surface estate." '134 North
Dakota's bill further attaches pore space rights to the surface estate by
prohibiting severance of pore space from the title to the overlying sur-
face real property. 35 Montana S.B. 498 creates a presumption that the
surface owner owns subsurface pore space if deeds or other severance
documents do not demonstrate otherwise. 136 Like Wyoming and North
Dakota, Montana's new statute explicitly does not interfere with com-
mon law or the dominance of the mineral estate. West Virginia's new
legislation creates a working group that will make recommendations to
the legislature on pore space ownership by 2011.117
This assignment of subsurface property rights in Wyoming, Mon-
tana, and North Dakota-and perhaps in other states in the future-has
the potential to create a direct conflict between state subsurface property
interests and any future federal or state efforts to facilitate the wide-
spread underground sequestration of CO 2. The number of states moving
to adopt similar legislation has recently increased considerably as legisla-
tors anticipate future carbon limits and try to settle potential property
rights disputes to create a more stable environment for future project de-
velopment. 138 The nature of subsurface property rights in general and the
potential conflict between state-created subsurface property rights and
future federal policies are discussed below in Parts II and III.
131. See S.B. 498, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2009) (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-180
(2009)); S.B. 2319, 61st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2009) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-31-01-
08 (2006 & Supp. 2009)); H.R. 89, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008) (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1-152 (2009)).
132. Wyo. H.R. 89 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-152(a)).
133. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-152(a); H.R. 57, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2009).
134. N.D. S.B. 2319 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-31-04).
135. Id. (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-31-05, -06 (2009)).
136. S.B. 498, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2009) (enacted at MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-180
(2009)).
137. H.B. 2860, 79th Leg., 1st Sess. (W. Va. 2009) (enacted in pertinent part at W. VA. CODE § 22-
11A-6 (2009)).
138. See TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE & GEOLOGIC STORAGE, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS
COMPACT COMM'N, STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURES: A LEGAL AND
REGULATORY GUIDE FOR STATES AND PROVINCES 16-22 (2007); Owen L. Anderson, Geologic CO2
Sequestration: Who Owns the Pore Space?, 9 WYO. L. REV. 97, 99 (2009); Reese, supra note 95. How-
ever, several states have authorized significant regulations, such as permitting rules for CO2 sequestra-
tion, without explicitly addressing property rights issues.
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TABLE 1
EXISTING STATE LEGISLATION AND REGULATION RELATING TO
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CO 2 SEQUESTRATION "9
Regulatory Pore Space Eminent Do- Mineral
Authority Ownership main Unitization Rights Pri-macy
CO, Sequestra-
Louisiana tion declared to
Louisia1a Office of be in the public
H.B. Conserva- interest. Public
HB. 1220 tion, Depart- Not ad- and private Not addressed, Not ad-
ment of dressed, entities may dressed.(2008); Natural Re- exercise emi-H.B. 1117
(2008) sources nent domain,
subject to cer-
tain findings.
Board of Oil Owners of 60%
and Gas or more of pore Common
Conserva- space storage law and do-
Montana tion, with Surface own- capacity may minance of
S.B. 498 comments er, severance Not addressed. apply to the Mineral es-
(2009) from Board allowed. Board of Oil and minral-tate not al-
of Environ- Gas to have the tered.
mental Re- area treated as a
view unit.
North Dakota
S.B. 2095 Common
(2009); SB Surface own- CO, Sequestra- Owners of 60% law and do-
2139 (2009); Industrial tion declared to or more of pore minance ofN.D.Admi. Cmmisioner, severance
N.D. Admin. Commission nr, allowed be in the public space capacity mineral es-
Code 42-02- interest, must approve. tate not al-
04.1 (pro- tered.
posed)
Corporation
Commission Corporation Common
Oklahoma (for fossil CO Sequestra- Commission will law and do-
S.B. 610 fuel-bearing Not ad- tion declared to be the regulato- minance of(2009; fomatio); . ry authority ifa(2009); formation); dressed, be in the public unitization mineral es-S.B. 1765 Dep't of En- interest, uizaon tate not al-
(2008) vironmental process is tee al
Quality for adopted.
all others.
CO, Seques- Common
Department tration Work- CO, Sequestra- law and do-H.B. 2860 of Environ- ing Group will tion declared to Not addressed. minance of
(2009) mental Pro- make recom- be in the public mineral es-
tection mendations in interest. tate not al-
2011. tered.
(Continued on next page)
139. Updated from Melisa F. Pollak & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Regulating Geologic Sequestration in
the United States: Early Rules Take Divergent Approaches, 43 ENvTL. SCI. & TECH. 3035. 3036-38
(2009), available at http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1021/es803094f, and Melisa F. Pollak & Sarah
Johnson Phillips, State Policy on Geologic Sequestration: 2009 Update, at 10 (2009) (on file with au-
thors).
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TABLE I-Continued
Regulatory Pore Space Eminent Do- ineral
Authority Ownership main Unitization Rights Pri-
macy
Wyoming interested
H.B. 57 Any(2009); person may ap-H.B. 58 ply to treat an
(2009); Darea as a unit;H.B.0 Department Oil and Gas Dominance
(2009); of Environ- srace N Conservation of the min-
(2009 mental er, severance Not addressed. Commission eral estateH.B. 89 allowed.
(2008); Quality may approve if affirmed.
Water Qual. owners of at
Rules & least 80% of
Regs. chap. pore space ap-
24 (proposed) prove.
II. THE SKIES, THE EARTH, AND THE SUBSURFACE: DEFINING
PROTECTABLE PROPERTY INTERESTS
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause states that private property
shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation.' 14  The
Constitution does not create or define the scope of property interests
protectable under the Fifth Amendment, but instead requires compensa-
tion in the event of an interference with those property interests that
amounts to a taking. 141 Thus, in determining whether a protectable prop-
erty interest exists, courts look to "existing rules or understandings" and
"background principles" derived from independent sources such as state
law, federal law, or common law. 142  Although property interests are of-
ten defined by state law, state-created property interests may be limited
by federal law, even in the area of real property. 143 The Supreme Court
has stated that the Takings Clause "was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'144
Once a protectable property interest is established, a court must de-
cide whether to analyze the government action in question as a physical
taking or as a regulatory taking. 145  A physical taking occurs when the
140. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
141. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) ("[T]he Constitution protects
rather than creates property interests .... ).
142. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v.
United States, 67 Fed. C. 504,515 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
143. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18 (stating that state-law definitions of private property rights
must be based on "an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents" (emphasis omitted));
Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 515 n.15 (stating an objective basis in defining property rights is "vital if the
integrity of the Takings Clause is to be preserved as against entirely novel and unprincipled definitions
of property designed artificially to defeat or buttress a takings claim") (citing Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
144. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
145. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,538 (2005).
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government engages in a permanent physical occupation of private prop-
erty or authorizes a third party to engage in such occupation. 4 6 In the
case of physical invasions, "no matter how minute the intrusion, and no
matter how weighty the public purpose behind it," a taking has occurred
and just compensation is required. 47 Even if there is no physical occupa-
tion of private property, a "regulatory taking" can occur if government
regulation places too great a burden on the owner's use of the proper-
ty.148  A regulatory taking can take place under two circumstances. 149
First, a regulatory action can be a "per se" taking when the regulation
completely deprives an owner of all reasonably beneficial use of her
property.50 Second, in the absence of a complete deprivation of all eco-
nomic use of the property, courts generally consider whether the regula-
tory restriction has risen to the level of a compensable taking under the
multifactor balancing test set out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City.' This test considers (1) the character of the government
action; (2) the severity of the economic impact; and (3) the extent to
which the regulation interferes with the property owner's distinct, "in-
vestment-backed" expectations.'5 2 Finally, even if the government en-
gages in a physical taking or a regulatory taking of private property, a vi-
olation of the Fifth Amendment only occurs if the taking is without "just
compensation."'53 As a result, if a court determines that the property
owner's net loss as a result of the taking is zero, the compensation due
under the Constitution is also zero. 54
Based on this framework, this Part considers the threshold question
of whether a landowner (or a mineral owner) has a sufficient interest in
the subsurface pore space to implicate the Takings Clause in the first
place. There is little dispute that, subject to reasonable regulation, the
surface owner of property has significant rights to use her property as she
sees fit and, just as important, has the right to exclude others from mak-
ing use of her property. If the state or federal government wishes to use
that property, take that property, or allow other private parties to use or
146. Id.; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that
state regulation requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to place cable facilities in their
apartment buildings constituted a taking even though the facilities occupied at most only one and one-
half cubic feet of the landlord's property).
147. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see also Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 233-34
(2003) (discussing rules regarding per se physical takings and holding that the state's requirement that
interest earned on certain client trust accounts be transferred to law-related charitable and educational
purposes should be subject to analysis under the per se physical taking test); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
148. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
(2002).
149. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
150. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (holding regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use
of land are just as much of a taking requiring compensation as permanent physical occupations of
land).
151. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
152. Id. at 124.
153. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003).
154. Id. at 237.
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take that property for a public purpose, the government can do so by vir-
tue of its eminent domain power but must pay "just compensation" to
the property owner. 5 Thus, the question arises as to how far up into the
sky and down into the earth do those rights extend? Most law students
in their first-year property course are taught the maxim "cujus ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad infernos" (translated as "the rights of the surface
owner extend upwards to the heavens [ad coelum] and downward to the
center of the earth [ad infernos]"). Students are also taught, however,
that with the advent of air travel in the 1930s, courts did away with the ad
coelum doctrine with regard to ownership of airspace high above the
ground. But what of the doctrine's continued application to the subsur-
face far below the ground?
Section A provides a brief history of the ad coelum doctrine and
how courts modified the doctrine with regard to airspace after the rise of
air travel in the early twentieth century. Section B considers whether
property rights and takings jurisprudence involving private property in
surface lands can be applied directly to subsurface rights in general and
subsurface pore space rights in particular. Section C then proceeds to
analyze case law in the areas of oil and gas development, underground
waste injection, and subsurface natural gas storage to show the different
approaches courts have taken to the issue of subsurface ownership.
These cases show that courts have taken a fairly nuanced approach to
subsurface property rights, rejecting many claims for technical trespass,
recognizing rights to recover for actual damage or interference with use,
and recognizing the need for compensation in cases of physical occupa-
tion of the subsurface in some circumstances. Thus, instead of vesting
absolute ownership of the subsurface in one party or another, courts ap-
pear to allow regulated use of the subsurface (by either the government
or private parties) when the use is in the public interest without always
requiring compensation for surface owners or mineral owners in the ab-
sence of actual harm or loss. Finally, Section D uses the case law dis-
cussed in the prior Sections to analyze various approaches courts and po-
licymakers can potentially use to resolve claims involving property rights
and takings in the context of subsurface pore space and CO2 sequestra-
tion.
A. Breaking Apart the Ad Coelum Doctrine from the Top Down
With regard to airspace, until the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, courts and commentators continued to invoke the ad coelum doc-
trine, stating that common law ownership of land "extended to the peri-
phery of the universe."'56 These statements, even in dicta, however, were
155. See infra Part III.A.
156. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) ("It is ancient doctrine that at common
law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe- Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum." (citing 1 COKE, INSTrrUTES, ch. 1, § 1(4a) (19th ed. 1832); 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
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put to rest with regard to airspace by the Supreme Court's 1946 decision
in United States v. Causby.5 7 In that case, the Court found that the plain-
tiff farmers could recover just compensation for a taking of an easement
on their farm by the federal government's frequent, low-level military
flights over the farm, which significantly interfered with their use and en-
joyment of the land and destroyed their ability to continue to use the
property as a commercial chicken farm.'58 In reaching that decision,
however, the Court contrasted the interference caused by the low-level
flights at issue in the case with the general principle that the ad coelum
doctrine "has no place in the modern world." 159 Instead, "the air is a
public highway" and "private claims to the airspace would clog [those]
highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the
public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the
public has a just claim."160
It is important to note that the Court was able to declare that the
national airspace was a "public highway" despite the historic ad coelum
doctrine because of Congress's enactment of the Air Commerce Act of
1926.161 In summarizing the government's position in the case, the Court
quoted heavily from that Act, which provided in part that the United
States has "complete and exclusive sovereignty" of the airspace over the
lands and water of the United States, that "navigable airspace shall be
subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air naviga-
tion," and that the airspace is recognized and declared to exist in behalf
of any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit in
air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United States. 162
The Court then made some attempt to distinguish between a land-
owner's protectable property interest in the airspace above the surface of
his or her lands and the "public highway" above that airspace.163 The
Court recognized that to have full enjoyment of the land, a landowner
"must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere" or else he or she could not plant trees or construct buildings
or fences."6 Thus, a landowner owns as much space above the ground as
he or she "can occupy or use in connection with the land."'65 Even if the
landowner does not actually occupy that space by erecting a building, the
intrusion by an airplane or another structure, even if it did not touch the
18 (Lewis ed. 1902); 3 KENT, COMMENTARIES 621 (Gould ed. 1896))); see also Sprankling, supra note
17, at 1000 ("American courts repeatedly advanced this expansive view of airspace rights-until the
invention of the airplane sparked litigation, especially in the 1930s.").
157. 328 U.S. at 256.
158. Id. at 259, 265.
159. Id. at 261.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 260 (citing Air Commerce Act of 1926,49 U.S.C. §§ 176(a), 180,403 (1946)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 261-62.
164. Id. at 264.
165. Id.
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surface, "is as much an appropriation of the use of land as a more con-
ventional entry upon it."'" With regard to airplanes, the Court held that
an airplane flight over land is lawful unless it is at such a low altitude as
to interfere with "then existing use to which the land or water, or the
space over the land or water, is put by the owner." '167 The Court con-
cluded this discussion by noting that the airplane is "part of the modem
environment of life," the inconveniences it causes are not normally com-
pensable under the Fifth Amendment, and the airspace (apart from that
immediately above the land) is part of the "public domain.""',
The Court expressly declined to determine the precise line that di-
vided the public domain of airspace from its lower reaches that were
within the realm of private property.'69 Instead, it held simply that
"[f]lights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment
and use of land."170 Thus, Causby and subsequent cases involving air-
space rights' show that once there developed a significant public inter-
est in airspace, and once Congress explicitly recognized and protected
that public interest by federal statute, courts responded by modifying the
ad coelum doctrine. Such modification served to limit a landowner's pro-
tectable property interests to the part of the airspace that could reasona-
bly be used "in connection with the land." '72 The case consequently elim-
inated trespass and takings claims relating to airspace except in cases,
like Causby, where there was "a direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment and use of land."' 73 It is this requirement that any interest
in airspace be tied to reasonable use of the surface of the land that is po-
tentially applicable to the discussion that follows on the extent of pro-
tectable property interests in the subsurface.
As shown in Section C below, courts deciding subsurface property
rights cases do look to Causby and other airspace cases for precedent in
some circumstances. 71 It is important to note at the outset, however, that
the case law in the area of subsurface rights is much more complicated
than that involving airspace. This complication arises from three main
factors that potentially distinguish the precedent involving airspace rights
from the precedent involving subsurface rights. The first distinction is
that unlike airspace rights, subsurface rights have been carved up, con-
166. Id. at 264.
167. Id. at 266.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.; see, e.g., United Masonry, Inc. v. Jefferson Mews, Inc., 237 S.E.2d 171, 181 (Va. 1977)
(stating that the common law ad coelum doctrine "has been modified so that now the landowner is
generally held to own only that amount of airspace he can reasonably use").
172. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
173. Id. at 264-66 ("The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that con-
tinuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself.").
174. See infra notes 215-21.
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veyed, used, bought, sold, and developed by private parties and federal,
state, and local governments since nearly the founding of the country.
This has resulted in ownership, use, and exploitation of the subsurface in
a manner far more tangible than ever existed for airspace rights. The
second distinction is that in the airspace cases there was a single and very
strong "public interest"-national airspace travel-competing against
surface interests. In cases involving subsurface rights, by contrast, the
surface owners' rights come up against multiple competing rights in the
public interest such as oil and gas development, subsurface groundwater
use, underground injection of hazardous waste, and underground natural
gas storage. All of these competing uses of the subsurface are arguably
in the public interest, they often conflict with each other, and all are sub-
ject to a federal or a state regulatory system designed to promote one or
more public interests. A third distinction is Congress's early declaration
that "airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate
and foreign air navigation" 175 as compared to the long history of subsur-
face rights being bought, sold, and privatized by the federal government,
the states, and private parties. While Congress may in the future enact
legislation to create a public right of freedom in the subsurface to facili-
tate CCS and other technological developments that are in the public in-
terest, the fact remains that such legislation will exist against a backdrop
of significantly more expectation of private property rights in the subsur-
face (at least in some parts of the country) than existed with regard to
airspace at the time Congress created a public highway in airspace.
So there are good arguments that the judicial and legislative
precedent that has limited private property rights in airspace may not be
completely dispositive in deciding cases involving subsurface property
rights in general and subsurface pore space rights in particular. The next
question is whether the rich body of case law involving traditional prop-
erty rights in the land's surface is dispositive on the question of property
rights in the subsurface, or whether there are relevant distinctions there
as well. The question is analyzed below in Section B.
B. Ownership and Occupation of Surface Lands Versus Ownership and
Occupation of Subsurface Lands
The bulk of cases involving property rights, takings, and trespass in-
volve, of course, ownership and use of the surface of the land. This
precedent was mentioned in the introduction to Part II and is discussed
more fully below in Part III. At this point, however, it is important to
consider whether this body of case law applies without distinction to
questions involving use and occupation of the subsurface. The leading
Supreme Court case on the physical occupation of the surface is Loretto
175. See 49 U.S.C. § 180 (1946) (cited in Causby, 328 U.S. at 260).
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.'7 6 In that case, the issue was
whether a New York law requiring a landlord to permit installation of
private cables on rental properties to facilitate cable television access was
a taking without just compensation. 17 7 The Supreme Court held that the
state statute did work a taking of a portion of the plaintiff's property
(approximately one and one-half cubic feet on the outside of the rental
building) for which she was entitled to just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.1 71 In reaching its decision, the Court, citing Causby, distin-
guished between the government's permanent, physical occupation of
property, which constitutes a "per se" taking in most cases, and a "regu-
lation that merely restricts the use of property."179 The Court found that
to the extent the government permanently occupies property (or grants
another party the right to do so), it effectively destroys the right to "pos-
sess, use, and dispose" of property and will always work a taking.180 The
Court found that in applying this per se taking rule for physical occupa-
tions, the size of the area occupied is irrelevant, as is whether the plaintiff
had previously occupied the space in question. 8' The Court also cited
Causby once again for the proposition that "[a]n owner is entitled to the
absolute and undisturbed possession of every part of his premises, in-
cluding the space above, as much as a mine beneath."' 8
In light of the sweeping language of Loretto, an initial question is
whether Loretto applies in all cases of physical use of subsurface pore
space. There is certainly language in the case that supports that conclu-
sion, particularly the declaration that the size of the area is irrelevant,
that the plaintiff need not have previously occupied the space in ques-
tion, and that there is a right of "undisturbed possession" of every part of
the premises including the space above and the "mine beneath."'" 3 On
the other hand, Causby, on which Loretto relies heavily, clearly limited
property interests in the skies above to that portion of the airspace that
was necessary to enjoy the surface of the land and did not include the
public highway in the airspace established by Congress.' 81 This limitation
arguably would protect interests in the subsurface that are necessary to
the reasonable use of the surface or are in existing economic use, but
176. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
177. Id. at 421.
178. Id. at 441. On remand, the lower court determined that just compensation was only one dol-
lar. and that ruling was affirmed on appeal. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446
N.E.2d 428,435 (N.Y. 1983).
179. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. at 261); see also Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003) (holding that a state law requiring that client funds that could not oth-
erwise generate net earnings for the client be deposited into account where such earnings are used for
law-related charitable and educational purposes was not a "regulatory taking," but that a law requiring
that the interest on those funds be transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public purpose
could be a per se physical taking akin to the occupation of a small amount of rooftop space in Loretto).
180. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
181. Id. at 436,438 n.16.
182. Id. at 437 n.13 (quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 256 n.10).
183. Id.
184. Causby, 328 U.S. at 266.
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perhaps would not protect all subsurface areas, particularly those far be-
low the surface of the earth. Thus, just as airspace rights end at some
point not far above the surface of the earth, perhaps pore space rights
end at some point not far below the surface of the earth. Once again
though, using Causby to support a more limited view of subsurface prop-
erty rights must be tempered by the real distinction between the histori-
cal use and regulation of subsurface and the use and regulation of the
airspace discussed in Section B.
Ultimately, courts will need to grapple with Causby, Loretto, and
the case law specific to subsurface property rights, discussed below in
Section C, whether or not Congress and the states attempt to increase or
limit property rights in subsurface pore space in connection with CCS or
other new technologies. Any legislative efforts to define or limit subsur-
face property rights to facilitate CCS will likely be subject to takings
challenges. While the Supreme Court has not yet decided any cases spe-
cific to subsurface pore space, some state courts have done so in connec-
tion with oil and gas development, underground waste injection, and
natural gas storage."" While these cases are not always consistent with
each other, there are some notable themes that emerge, which are dis-
cussed below in Section C.
C. Ownership of Space Versus Ownership of Resources and the Role of
the Public Interest
Despite the lack of clear judicial precedent on a national level in-
volving subsurface pore space rights, there is a rich body of state case law
involving subsurface property rights in a range of circumstances, some
involving ownership of resources and others involving ownership of sub-
surface space itself. We find the most applicable cases to be those that
arise from the following three situations: (1) regulatory creation of un-
itized oil fields and secondary oil and gas recovery that interferes with
neighboring subsurface rights, (2) regulatory approval for subsurface
waste injection, and (3) regulatory approval for subsurface natural gas
storage. In each of these situations, courts balance private surface inter-
ests, private subsurface interests, and the public interest in various ways,
based on the resource or use at issue.
These situations, like CO 2 sequestration, are arguably different from
the numerous judicial decisions involving subsurface water rights, oil and
gas rights, hard-rock mining rights, or coal-bed methane (CBM) gas
ownership, which are the other categories of subsurface rights that are
regularly litigated today.' In those cases, courts are called upon to re-
185. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stryker, 723 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1998); Chance v. BP Chems.,
Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996); Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 808 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App. 1991).
186. For a succinct discussion of how courts have historically resolved ownership disputes in each
of these areas, see Sprankling, supra note 17, at 1005-13; Elizabeth J. Wilson & Mark A. de Figueire-
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solve disputes over who is entitled by common law, statute, or contract
(in the case of a conveyance or reservation of mineral or oil and gas in-
terests) to own, extract, or develop a valuable resource. For instance,
subsurface water rights require the resolution of multiple and competing
claims to a finite and valuable resource-water-that is subject to a com-
plex regulatory regime that differs from state to state, depending on the
water availability and needs of that state."s In the CBM cases, courts are
called upon to determine whether the surface owner, coal owner, or nat-
ural gas owner has the right to develop and sell CBM gas under govern-
ment land patents or private conveyance documents that did not antic-
ipate the technology that recently created a commercial use for CBM
gas. 188 Thus, instead of involving the use of space in the subsurface, these
do, Geologic Carbon Dioxide Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface Property Law, 36 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,114,10,116-18 (2006).
187. See S.W. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 212 P.3d 1, 10 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that water district's right to divert water into a river abutting company's land
was not limited by doctrine of non-injurious use, company did not have power to preclude district
from diverting water into the river, and company could not prevail on claims for negligence, trespass,
nuisance, or inverse condemnation); W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dept. of Water Res., 26 P.3d
1171, 1175 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that statutorily authorized diversion of water over private
property was not a government taking or trespass based in part on the fact that "Arizona is an arid
desert" and has a "policy predating statehood that encourages the full and beneficial use of scarce wa-
ter resources"); Alameda County Water Dist. v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 853 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1974) (denying excavation company's claim for inverse condemnation against water district
on grounds that flooding of excavation pit under district's water replenishment program constituted a
taking of property and discussing California's rejection of the ad coelum doctrine based on the "reali-
ties of the underground water situation in California" and its replacement with the "correlative rights
doctrine," which limits the rights of each surface owner to reasonable use of percolating waters in cor-
relation with those of other users); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, L.L.P.,
45 P.3d 693, 706 (Colo. 2002) (holding landowners did not have a property right under the ad coelum
doctrine to require that the ranch obtain their consent before recharging aquifer, the ranch was not
required to pay compensation, and basing its decision on the "Colorado doctrine," which established
that water is a public resource; the right to water includes the right to cross the land of others; and nat-
ural, water-bearing formations within the state may be used for the transport and retention of water);
McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 646 (Ohio 2005) (holding that landowners have a
property interest in the groundwater underlying their land and governmental interference with that
right can be an unconstitutional taking based in part on Ohio's "unique water resources and water
needs"); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974) (rejecting doctrine of cor-
relative rights because water is not scarce in Wisconsin and adopting an approach modeled on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1977), which places no restrictions on the taking of
groundwater so long it is used in a reasonable and beneficial manner on the extractor's land); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (stating a landowner who withdraws groundwater from the
land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not liable for interference with the use of water by another
unless the withdrawal unreasonably causes harm to neighboring landowners by lowering the water
table or reducing pressure, the withdrawal exceeds the landowner's reasonable share of the annual
supply or total supply of groundwater, or the withdrawal of groundwater has a "direct and substantial
effect upon a watercourse or lake" and unreasonable causes harm to a person entitled to use of its wa-
ter); JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 364-65 (3d ed. 2000) (summariz-
ing the different legal regimes that states apply to groundwater rights); Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra
note 186, at 10,117 (discussing various doctrines states have created to resolve property rights disputes
over groundwater, including the absolute dominion doctrine, reasonable use doctrine, correlative
rights doctrine, Restatement rule, and prior appropriation doctrine).
188. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 878 (1999) (holding that surface
owner, not tribe holding equitable title to reserved coal in lands patented under Coal Lands Acts of
1909 and 1910, owned CBM gas contained in the coal, based in part on grounds that Congress did not
"appear to have given consideration to the possibility that CBM gas would one day be a profitable
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cases involve the use of valuable resources to be taken from the subsur-
face for commercial gain. The subsurface water, CBM, and other miner-
al rights cases involve disputes over ownership of a valuable commodity
found within the subsurface rather than disputes over ownership of the
subsurface itself, which can be used to store either a waste product (like
the underground waste injection cases) or a valuable commodity (like the
natural gas storage cases). Said another way, both the subsurface pore
space below and the airspace above provide valuable space for compet-
ing uses such as airplanes and buildings above and oil, gas, water, and
CBM below. As a result, the cases focusing on ownership of the space
for the resource, commodity, or development may be more helpful than
cases focusing on ownership of the resource, commodity, or development
itself, although the latter group of cases may still be instructive in some
circumstances. For the remainder of this Article, however, we put aside
the subsurface water, CBM, and mineral rights cases and focus on judi-
cial decisions in the areas of oil and gas development, underground waste
injection, and subsurface natural gas storage.
In cases involving secondary oil recovery and subsurface waste in-
jection, courts have modified the ad coelum doctrine and limited surface
owner rights to recover for trespass or to establish a taking as a result of
federal or state regulation authorizing the invasive activity at issue to
promote the public interest.189 On the other hand, in cases involving sub-
surface natural gas storage, operators have proceeded under the Natural
Gas Act to take subsurface property by eminent domain, thus implicitly
recognizing (or at least not expressly challenging) the existence of a pro-
tectable property interest deserving of at least some compensation. 11 It
is not a stretch for future courts to look to these cases for guidance in de-
fining the rights of surface owners or mineral owners to prevent access to
the deep pore space beneath the surface for CO2 sequestration in the ab-
sence of compensation.' These cases are discussed below.
energy source developed on a large scale"); Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680,
687 (Mont. 1995) (holding CBM gas was not part of the coal estate granted by the county and thus
could be severed from the coal estate); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1388 (Pa. 1983) (hold-
ing that CBM gas belongs to the owner of the coal estate so long as the gas physically remains in the
coal itself and does not migrate to surrounding property); Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d
540, 550 (Wyo. 2002) (holding that deed from landowners to coal operator granting coal and minerals
comingled with the coal but reserving all "oil, gas, and other minerals" did not convey the landowners'
ownership of CBM gas).
189. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2008).
190. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
191. Recent white papers and articles have analyzed whether, in the first instance, the surface
owner or the mineral owner on split-estate land has property rights in the pore space. While most of
these papers and articles conclude that the surface owner would prevail over the mineral owner in
most cases, the issue is far from resolved. See Anderson, supra note 138, at 99-101 (stating that Texas
and other jurisdictions have not specifically determined who owns subterranean pore space as between
a mineral owner and a surface owner but, based on existing case law and legal doctrine, the most "like-
ly" owner of the pore space is the surface owner); Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 186, at 10,121-
22 (stating that most courts have held that after the removal of underground minerals, oil, or gas, the
surface owner retains the right to use the remaining space for storage but that mineral rights holders
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1. Oil and Gas Operations: Secondary Oil Recovery and Field
Unitization
For decades, oil producers have injected fluids into the subsurface
to increase oil production from nearly depleted fields."9 When using wa-
ters, this process is known as "secondary recovery," and it adds pressure
to the reservoir to enhance oil and gas recovery.'93 Secondary recovery
can also result in migration of the injected fluids, or the native oil and
gas, to a neighboring oil and gas lease, affecting that owner's ability to
recover the resource. 194 Most secondary recovery activities take place in
a field that has been "unitized" pursuant to state regulatory board or-
ders. 195 With "field unitization," the oil or gas leases for development are
combined, and production and profits are shared by the unit members.'96
For those areas that are not unitized or where neighboring owners have
not joined the unit, trespass claims and other disputes arise when sec-
ondary recovery operations invade those oil and gas leases that are not
part of the unit.19
For the most part, courts have rejected claims for trespass in these
cases on the grounds that secondary recovery is authorized by state regu-
lation, results in the most efficient recovery of the resource, or otherwise
is in the public interest. 198 For instance, in Railroad Commission of Texas
v. Manziel,'99 the Texas Supreme Court in 1964 rejected a trespass claim
by a mineral owner against the Texas Railroad Commission for its ap-
proval of a secondary recovery project where the injection of salt water
could potentially migrate across the property lines and damage the plain-
tiff's producing well. 200 In dismissing the claim, the court did not deter-
mine whether the injecting operator would be liable for actual damages
to the adjoining property or whether the Commission's authorization of
such secondary recovery operations would instead throw "a protective
cloak" around the injecting operator.20' Instead, the court decided only
the question of "whether a trespass is committed when secondary recov-
often retain some rights to access the pore space for continued exploration or extraction of minerals in
other areas); see also DAVID COONEY, IOGCC TASK FORCE ON CARBON CAPTURE AND GEOLOGIC
STORAGE, PART 2: ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS ISSUES RELATED TO UNDERGROUND SPACE
USED FOR GEOLOGIC STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE (2007) (surveying case law from various states
that addresses rights relating to natural gas storage).
192. See MAXWELL ET AL., supra note 79, at 13-14 (discussing secondary oil recovery technology).
193. Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), by contrast, refers to tertiary recovery (often using CO2) to
enhance oil production and recovery. Id.
194. SEAN McCoY, CCSREG PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF: GOVERNING ACCESS TO AND USE OF
PORE SPACE FOR DEEP GEOLOGICAL SEQUESTRATION 13 n.17 (2009), http://www.ccsreg.org/pdf/
PoreSpace_07132009.pdf.
195. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 186, at 10,118.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 10,118-19.
199. 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
200. Id. at 566-69.
201. Id. at 566-67.
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ery waters from an authorized secondary recovery project cross lease
lines."'2 On that question, the court found that "[t]he orthodox rules
and principles applied by the courts as regards surface invasions of land
may not be appropriately applied to subsurface invasions as arise out of
the secondary recovery of natural resources." 203 To apply the general
rules of surface invasions would interfere with the public policy consider-
ations behind secondary recovery operations which, the court found,
should be encouraged as a matter of "public necessity."
The Alabama Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Stryker,205 where secondary recovery through injection
of dry gas within a unitized oil and gas field allegedly drained the plain-
tiff's oil reserves. 2°6 In reversing a jury award of $26.9 million to the
plaintiff based on claims of trespass, negligence, fraud, and nuisance, the
court found that to hold the defendant liable in the case would be against
the state's policy of promoting secondary recovery in order to prevent oil
and gas waste. 07 Instead of suing for damages, the plaintiff should have
engaged in his own recovery operations or sought to participate in the
unit.2'
The Louisiana Supreme Court has similarly allowed the public in-
terest in field unitization to trump any absolute property rights. In Nu-
nez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co.,2 the court rejected a landowner's tres-
pass claim against a well operator that drilled a well which allegedly
bottomed out on the plaintiff's property two miles below the surface.2
10
Notably, the plaintiff's property was within a drilling unit created by the
Commissioner of Conservation, but the plaintiff had declined to lease his
land to a defendant that had received approval for the unit.211 In reject-
ing the trespass claim, the court recognized that Louisiana law historical-
ly allowed claims of subsurface trespass where a well bottoms out on the
land of another without his or her consent.212 Here, though, the court
found that the state's creation of the Conservation Commission and the
state policy of ensuring that "an irreplaceable natural resource should
not be subjected to avoidable waste" created "a qualification of sorts in
one's rights in private property. '21 In light of these statutory develop-
ments and the current regulatory structure favoring unitization as the
method to reconcile the correlative rights of resource owners in a com-
202. Id.
203. Id. at 568.
204. Id.
205. 723 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1998).
206. Id. at 586-87.
207. Id. at 588.
208. Id. at 591.
209. 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986).
210. Id. at 956, 964.
211. Id. at 956.
212. Id. at 958.
213. Id. at 960-62.
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mon pool, the court found there was no legally actionable trespass in the
case. 214
The Texas Supreme Court again addressed the ability of a mineral
owner to sue for trespass as a result of secondary recovery operations in
2008. In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust,"5 the court
considered whether a defendant well operator engaging in "fracing"
(stimulating a natural gas well by pumping fluid down the well at high
pressure in order to create cracks in the rock to allow oil and gas to flow)
would be liable for trespass if "proppants" (sand, ceramic beads, or baux-
ite that follow the fluid and prop open the cracks in the rock) used in the
process migrated to the plaintiff's land two miles below the surface and
drained the oil and gas from the plaintiff's property. 16 In that case, the
plaintiff sought damages equal to the value of the royalty on the gas that
would be drained from the land."7 The court began its discussion by not-
ing that if the defendant had "caused something like proppants to be de-
posited on the surface of [the plaintiff's land], it would be liable for tres-
pass."2 '8 The court noted, however, that just as the Supreme Court in
Causby found the ad coelum doctrine had no place "in the modern
world" with regard to airspace two miles above the ground, the doctrine
also no longer applied two miles below the ground. 9 The court then
stated that the plaintiff might have a claim for damages if he could show
the defendant's fracing operations damaged the plaintiff's wells or the
formation beneath his property.2 0 The plaintiff could not show that,
however, and simply alleged the trespass of proppants would result in gas
flowing from the plaintiff's property to the defendant's wells.221
The plaintiff's claim, the court found, was prevented by the rule of
capture, which holds that the plaintiff does not own the oil and gas under
his property until he has "captured" it.222 Thus, the gas the plaintiff al-
leged he would lose "simply [did] not belong to him. ' 223 Instead, his rem-
edy under the rule of capture was to drill an offset well to protect against
the drainage or, if that was not effective, to make an offer to pool the re-
214. Id. at 963-64.
215. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
216. Id. at 7,9.
217. Id. at 8.
218. Id. at 11.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 13.
221. Id. at 12-13.
222. Id. In Texas, "a mineral rights owner has a real interest in oil and gas in place," but that right
does not extend to any particular gas beneath the property. Id. at 15. Instead, ownership must "be
considered in connection with the law of capture which is recognized as a property right." Id. (quoting
Texaco, Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n, 583 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1979)). Today, states where oil and gas are
commercially produced are primarily divided by whether they follow the rule of capture or recognize
ownership of oil and gas in a manner similar to how they recognize ownership of hard minerals. In
practice, however, states have adopted remedial legislation putting oil and gas interests in substantially
the same position regardless of which rule is followed. See OWEN L. ANDERSON ET AL.,
HEMMINGWAY OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 29-36 (4th ed. 2004).
223. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 13.
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sources or apply to the Railroad Commission for forced pooling. 224 The
court reasoned that "[t]he rule of capture makes it possible for the
Commission to enact and enforce rules governing the spacing, density,
and allowables of wells, to protect correlative rights of owners with inter-
ests in the same mineral deposits while securing 'the state's goals of pre-
venting waste and conserving natural resources.' 22  Moreover, allowing
litigation over recovery for draining resulting in fracing would force
judges and juries to make difficult factual determinations based on proof
"hidden below miles of rock" and make decisions without taking into ac-
count "social policies, industry operations, and the greater good," which
are important in determining whether fracing should or should not be
against the law.26 Thus, the court held that subsurface draining of oil
and gas through fracing was not actionable in tort, but non-draining
damages to wells or the oil and gas formation might be. 227
In all of these cases, the courts placed great emphasis on the state's
statutory policy of encouraging secondary recovery operations to pro-
mote the efficient use and development of natural resources, which was
in the public interest. The courts focused on the existence of a state reg-
ulatory body to balance the needs of the various rights-holders and re-
fused tort recovery for those who declined to participate in unitization or
otherwise capture or exploit resources on their lands in a manner consis-
tent with state policy and regulation. Also in these cases, though, there is
at least the recognition that future plaintiffs may be able to recover
where there is actual damage to a plaintiff's wells, formation, or other
tangible property, rather than simply a technical trespass of fluid or other
materials. This supports the idea that if there is actual interference with
commercial use of the subsurface, some recovery under tort law may be
warranted even if the defendant's operations are authorized under state
law. This is consistent with case law in other states that allows plaintiffs
to be compensated for actual damages resulting from secondary recov-
ery. 28 Allowing recovery in tort for actual damage to property is differ-
ent, however, than finding the plaintiff in these cases has the type of
"property" right in the subsurface that would allow the plaintiff to ex-
clude others from invading the property with fluids, proppants, or other
substances in connection with resource development. It is this type of
absolute ownership doctrine that courts seem to have rejected in the sec-
ondary recovery and field unitization cases and which acts as a potential
224. Id. at 14.
225. Id. at 14-15 (quoting Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n, 226 S.W.3d 383, 389 (Tex.
2007)).
226. Id. at 16.
227. Id. at 17.
228. See Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439, 440, 444 (10th Cir.
1971) (granting recovery based on private nuisance for damage caused by salt water encroachment
associated with secondary recovery operations); Boyce v. Dundee Healdton Sand Unit, 560 P.2d 234,
238 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) (granting recovery for nuisance claim for damages caused by water flood-
ing).
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precedent in future cases involving sequestration of CO 2 for CCS pur-
poses, particularly in states that now provide for CO2 unitization.
20
2. Underground Waste Injection
Judicial decisions in the area of underground waste injection also
provide helpful precedent in determining the extent to which courts rec-
ognize and protect surface owners' rights to the subsurface. Since the
1930s, oil producers have disposed of brine and other oil-producing
waste by injecting it underground into deep, subsurface rock forma-
tions. 231 Chemical companies began using the process a few decades later
to dispose of nonhazardous and hazardous industrial wastes. 232 Today,
the EPA and delegated state agencies regulate the underground injection
of wastes under the UIC program by creating "classes" of injection wells
and setting standards for injection to protect underground sources of
drinking water.233 There are approximately 260 nonhazardous and 120
hazardous waste Class I wells operating in nineteen states, with most in-
jecting at average depths of 1400 meters (4500 feet).234
Like in the secondary recovery and field unitization cases, courts
faced with attempts by surface owners to prevent waste disposal below
the surface of their properties have not been successful without establish-
ing harm to their actual use of that subsurface. For instance, in Chance v.
BP Chemicals, Inc.,235 the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the plaintiff
property owners' claims of trespass, strict liability, nuisance, negligence,
and fraud for damage allegedly caused by lateral migration of hazardous
waste refining products more than 790 meters (2600 feet) below the sur-
face that were produced in connection with the defendant's deep well in-
jection technology.236 The defendant operated the injection wells pur-
suant to permits and regulatory practices of both the U.S. EPA and Ohio
EPA.2 7 As part of their claim, the plaintiffs contended that they owned
everything below the surface of their property, including the geologic
229. In these cases, courts can be seen as creating a "liability rule" as opposed to a "property
rule" that protects property owners. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972)
(reasoning that some entitlements are protected by a "property rule" (i.e., an injunction) which per-
mits violation of the entitlement only with permission of the property owner while other entitlements
are protected by a "liability rule" (i.e., damages) which permits violation of the entitlement without
permission of the owner so long as the violator pays damages).
230. See supra Table 1.
231. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Underground Injection Control Program, Basic
Information About Injection Wells, http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/uic/basicinformation.htm (last vi-
sited Dec. 17, 2009).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Elizabeth J. Wilson et al., Regulating the Ultimate Sink: Managing the Risks of Geologic
CO2 Storage, 37 ENVTL. Scd. & TECH. 3476, 3478 tbl.2 (2003).
235. 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996).
236. Id. at 986-89.
237. Id. at 987.
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formations into which the hazardous waste was being injected, and that
they had the right to exclude the defendants from their properties. 238
The court began its discussion by noting that even though the de-
fendants were operating pursuant to valid state and federal permits, that
in itself did not shield them from liability.29 In reviewing the plaintiffs'
claims for relief, however, the court placed weight on the fact that the
plaintiffs had no specific evidence the defendants' wells were causing any
problems, only "opinion testimony that problems may arise in the fu-
ture.""24 That left primarily the trespass claim and the argument that
plaintiffs had the right to exclude the injectate from their property under
the ad coelum doctrine.241  The court rejected strict application of the
doctrine, finding that "ownership rights in today's world are not so clear-
cut as they were before the advent of airplanes and injection wells."2 42 It
found that "[j]ust as a property owner must accept some limitations on
the ownership rights extending above the surface of the proper-
ty ... there are also limitations on property owners' subsurface rights. '243
Thus, the court found that although the plaintiffs did have a property in-
terest in the subsurface containing the injectate, it was a "potentially lim-
ited one. '' 244 As a result, it rejected the idea of "presumed" damages as
would be available in cases of surface trespass, and instead held that
there must be some type of physical damage or interference with use for
the plaintiffs to recover for subsurface trespass. 245
In FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission,246 the Texas Court of Appeals conducted a similar analysis
when faced with a landowner's claim that the Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission's grant of two nonhazardous Class I permits
for injection of waste 2200 to 2500 meters (7350 to 8200 feet) below the
surface into a saline formation under the plaintiff's property constituted
a taking of private property without just compensation.24 7 First, the
Court expressly rejected the ad coelum doctrine and refused to accept
the plaintiff's argument that migration of the waste plume under the
plaintiff's property, without some measure of harm, could constitute a
trespass. 248 Instead, it deferred to the Commission's expertise in the geo-
logical effects of subsurface migration of injectates and its conclusion in
the administrative proceeding below that the injection would not impair
238. Id.
239. Id. at 990.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 991.
242. Id. at 992.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 993.
246. No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183 (Tex. App. Feb. 6, 2003).
247. Id. at *1.
248. Id. at *3-4.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
any existing rights and would be in the public interest.249 Although the
plaintiff had testified in the proceedings that it was now prohibited from
acquiring its own permit to store saltwater or subsurface waste on its
property because of the permit that had already been granted for that
area, the court found there was no evidence that the existing permits
would hamper the plaintiff's ability to use the deep subsurface in the
same manner in the future.
211
As for the takings claim itself, the court rejected the idea that ap-
proval of the injection constituted a "permanent, physical occupation of
property" of the type the Supreme Court of the United States held was a
per se taking requiring just compensation in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.2 1 The court found that Loretto did not apply
because the plaintiff could not show that migration of the waste plume
would prevent it from engaging in a brine mining operation or conduct-
ing its own injection well, and thus could not show it had lost the right to
use the property. 252 The court concluded, however, that if the waste
plume did migrate to the plaintiff's property and did cause harm, the
plaintiff could then seek damage from the well operator because, under
state statute, the existence of a permit did not relieve a party of civil lia-
bility for harm. 25
3
Finally, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
reached a similar conclusion in Raymond v. Union Texas Petroleum
Corp.254 In that case, the defendant injected saltwater into a disposal well
on neighboring property that allegedly migrated and invaded the subsur-
face of the plaintiffs' property. 255 The plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin the
injection or challenge the state-issued disposal permit, but instead sought
to be paid rentals for the disposal of saltwater under their land just as
one of their neighbors had been paid.256 In rejecting the trespass claim,
the court relied upon the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Nunez,
which held that "traditional property concepts like trespass[] must yield
to the important interest of conserving the natural resources of the
state. ' 257 It concluded that based on Nunez, there was no legally action-
249. Id. at *4.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *5 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982));
see also infra Part III.
252. FPL Farming, Ltd., 2003 WL 247183, at *5. Notably, the Supreme Court in Loretto found
that the property owner need not show actual use of the property in question in order to support a
claim for a per se physical taking. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16 ("It is constitutionally irrelevant
whether appellant (or her predecessor in title) had previously occupied this space, since 'a landowner
owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land."' (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S 256, 264 (1946))). Arguably though, the holding in
Loretto could be read to limit the plaintiff's interest to reasonable occupation of the space in question
as opposed to actual occupation.
253. FPL Farming, Ltd., 2003 WL 247183, at *5.
254. 697 F. Supp. 270,274 (E.D. La. 1988).
255. Id. at 271.
256. Id. at 273.
257. Id. at 274; see also supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
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able trespass, but that Nunez did not preclude a landowner from recover-
ing compensation for damage to property or measurable inconve-
nience. 28 The court found that the rentals paid to the neighbor were
compensation for surface use of the property and any inconvenience
caused by the disposal operations, but that there was no evidence the
underground disposal of saltwater damaged the subsurface formation,
fresh water, or mineral-bearing strata, or that it caused any surface or
subsurface inconvenience to the plaintiff.259
The underground waste injection cases- hazardous, nonhazardous,
and hydrocarbon associated water-show that courts have rejected any
form of the ad coelum doctrine when it comes to surface owner efforts to
prevent the underground migration of waste on their property in the ab-
sence of actual harm when the injection of waste is conducted pursuant
to federal or state permits. In each case, the court placed great weight on
the public interest and regulatory approval associated with the under-
ground injection of waste products and modified existing doctrines relat-
ing to subsurface property rights accordingly. At the same time, howev-
er, each of the courts held open the possibility that a plaintiff could
recover if it could show actual damage or actual interference with use of
either the surface or the subsurface. Thus, the courts refused any abso-
lute property rights in the deep subsurface, but retained limited property
rights that would allow surface owners to seek damages or just compen-
sation for a condemnation in case of actual interference or harm.
3. Subsurface Natural Gas Storage
The last set of cases relevant to the issue of property rights and CO2
sequestration are those that have resolved disputes over property rights
and the subsurface storage of natural gas. "Natural gas is stored under-
ground in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, salt caverns, or suitable natural
aquifers to provide for the increased demand for natural gas during the
winter months. ' ' 260 Domestic natural gas storage capacity is approximate-
ly 230 billion cubic meters (8.1 trillion cubic feet).2 61 Under the Natural
Gas Act and judicial decisions interpreting the Act, natural gas operators
that have obtained a "certificate of public convenience and necessity"
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have the
power of eminent domain to take land and create not only interstate nat-
ural gas pipelines, but also associated underground natural gas storage
facilities. 62 Not surprisingly, courts have been forced to resolve disputes
258. Raymond, 697 F. Supp. at 274.
259. Id. at 274-75; see also Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
that wastewater injected by defendant on its property that migrated under the plaintiffs property did
not constitute a taking without just compensation).
260. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 186, at 10,121.
261. Id.
262. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2006); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Gas Storage
Easement, 776 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1985); Steven D. McGrew, Note, Selected Issues in Federal Con-
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over ownership and valuation of the pore space in which the natural gas
is stored when that pore space also is in potential or actual use by surface
owners or mineral rights owners.
As an initial matter, numerous courts have held that after the re-
moval of underground minerals, oil, or gas, the surface owner retains the
right to use the remaining space for storage, although mineral rights
holders have also been found to have some retained interest in the sto-
rage space if they held exploratory rights or constructed the storage
space. 263 Thus, in developing natural gas storage rights, natural gas com-
panies often have included both the surface owner and mineral owner in
condemnation actions, providing just compensation to both sets of inter-
ests. 26 Accordingly, although the rest of this Section refers to disputes
between natural gas owners and surface owners, mineral owners may al-
so have subsurface rights that come into conflict with natural gas storage
efforts.
Two main types of disputes arise in subsurface natural gas storage
cases. The first is where the natural gas company obtains a certificate of
public convenience and necessity from FERC and then attempts to con-
tract with the surface owner to obtain the necessary storage rights, and, if
they are unable to reach agreement, the company exercises the power of
eminent domain to take the subsurface within the area covered by the
certificate. 265 In these cases, there may be disputes surrounding valuation
of the storage space, but the access rights are settled. The second type of
dispute is where the natural gas company fails to obtain all of the storage
rights within the area in which it intends to operate, creating a "window"
in the storage field.2 66 In such a case, the owner of a window property
may attempt to sue for trespass once storage operations begin or, when a
window owner threatens to drill into the storage field or surrounding
area, the gas company may file a condemnation action to prevent the
owner from either withdrawing the company's stored gas or damaging
the integrity of the storage field. 267 At that point, the window owner may
counterclaim for trespass and seek an injunction, compensatory damages,
and punitive damages.26 Courts in these cases have reached mixed con-
clusions on the issue of property rights.
For instance, landowners in Kansas sued Northern Natural Gas
Company asserting claims of trespass and unjust enrichment related to
demnation for Underground Natural Gas Storage Rights: Valuation Methods, Inverse Condemnation,
and Trespass, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 131,138-41 (2000).
263. See Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 808 S.W.2d 262, 277-78 (Tex. App. 1991); Alan Stamm, Legal
Problems in the Underground Storage of Natural Gas, 36 TEx. L. REV. 161, 165--68 (1957); Wilson &
de Figueiredo, supra note 186, at 10,121-22; see also Anderson, supra note 138, at 105-06 (discussing
Mapco and how far its holding extends).
264. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 186, at 10,122.
265. See McGrew, supra note 262, at 138-40.
266. See Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 186, at 10,122.
267. Id.
268. See McGrew, supra note 262, at 142.
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the migration of gas to the Simpson formation underlying their land. 269 A
federal jury "found in favor of the landowners on both claims and
awarded $100.00 per acre as fair rental value of the property for the pe-
riod in question. ' 270 By contrast, in a Michigan case, the federal district
court held that the underground movement of native gas from the com-
pany's storage field to the area under the plaintiffs' property was not the
type of physical intrusion that would support a claim for inverse con-
demnation, particularly without a showing of actual harm.271
This precedent raises the issue of whether a landowner always has a
property interest in the subsurface sufficient to require the gas company
to condemn the subsurface rights prior to using it for gas storage, and, if
the company fails to do so, whether the surface owner can sue for tres-
pass and seek not only compensatory damages (if any) but also punitive
damages based on the technical trespass." The gas company could cer-
tainly argue that just as courts have recognized that surface owners have
no absolute rights to the airspace above their property, they should have
no absolute rights to the subsurface below their property. While as a
practical matter natural gas companies have generally paid the surface or
mineral owner for the subsurface space necessary to store the gas, that
does not mean there are not arguments against the existence of subsur-
face property rights in this context that are available based on the uniti-
zation and waste injection cases. 273
D. Conclusion
Based on the analysis in the preceding Sections, there are two main
themes in the cases that may be relevant to subsurface sequestration of
CO2 in connection with CCS. First, as shown in the oil and gas develop-
ment and underground waste injection cases,274 a federal or state regula-
tory program can authorize some invasions of the subsurface and can
serve to protect against claims of takings or trespass when the invasion is
269. Beck v. N. Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1999).
270. Id.
271. ANR Pipeline Co. v. 60 Acres of Land, 418 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
272. See id. at 946 (discussing claims for damages in subsurface trespass cases); Alexandra B.
Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 105-07 (2007) (discussing availabili-
ty of punitive damages in surface trespass cases). To the extent a property is in split estate, and the
natural gas storage interferes with the mineral rights owner's ability to develop the oil or gas, then the
mineral rights owner may also have a claim for trespass or a right to just compensation resulting from
condemnation.
273. But see McGrew, supra note 262, at 176-79 (arguing that surface owners should be able to
sue for trespass when natural gas companies fail to use condemnation authority to obtain storage
rights and thus recognizing an inherent property right regardless of any showing that the owner had an
alternative reasonable use for the storage space).
274. See Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1988); Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Stryker, 723 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1998); Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955
(La. 1986); Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962);
FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, No. 03-02-00477-CV, 2003 WL 247183
(Tex. App. Feb. 6,2003).
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incidental, the landowner had an opportunity to participate in the regula-
tory program, or the landowner cannot show actual harm to its use or en-
joyment of the surface or subsurface. Thus, while courts have rejected
any absolute rights to the subsurface on the part of the landowner, they
have retained limited landowner rights to use and exploit the subsurface
and recover for actual harm caused by subsurface invasions. 275 In many
ways, this is similar to what courts have done with airspace rights near
the surface, as opposed to airspace rights miles above.276 In recent years,
courts have been quite willing to allow landowners to sue for trespass
and nuisance when airborne particles and pollution invade the landown-
er's airspace and cause harm.277 While landowners cannot sue for just
any invasion of particles, courts routinely allow such suits upon a show-
ing of harm. 78 Thus, in the airspace pollution cases, the court looks to
see whether the invasion is actually interfering with the plaintiff's use
and enjoyment of the property and has caused actual harm.279 In the sub-
surface invasion cases, as shown above, the courts are looking at almost
precisely the same factors and reaching similar conclusions.a8 Second,
Congress has chosen to recognize some property rights in the subsurface
for takings purposes in the natural gas storage cases by setting up a statu-
tory system, whereby natural gas companies are given authority to take
subsurface storage space by eminent domain and pay just compensation
if a voluntary contractual agreement cannot be reached. 281 In doing so,
Congress chose not to declare a "public highway" in the subsurface or
otherwise limit private interests in the subsurface.
How then should this precedent apply to the subsurface sequestra-
tion of C0 2? We conclude that there are multiple approaches to proper-
ty rights courts and policymakers can pursue based on this precedent,
ranging from (1) recognizing very limited private property rights in sub-
surface pore space and requiring compensation only in cases of actual
harm or where ongoing economic uses in the subsurface are destroyed;
(2) recognizing private property rights in subsurface pore space in cases
where there is ongoing use of the subsurface or such use is reasonably
foreseeable; and (3) recognizing private property rights in the subsurface
275. See supra note 274.
276. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
277. See, e.g., Davis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 445 P.2d 481,483 (Or. 1968) (holding that intrusion
of fumes, gases, and microscopic particles on the property of another can constitute a trespass in addi-
tion to a nuisance); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 402-03 (7th ed. 2007)
(discussing how some courts have allowed claims for trespass, in addition to nuisance, for claims based
on the intrusion of smoke, gases, or odors).
278. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 277, at 386, 389 (discussing requirement of harm to pre-
vail on claims for nuisance and unintentional trespass with no showing of harm required for intention-
al trespass cases); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-829A (1977) (setting forth harm
component of nuisance claim).
279. HENDERSON ETAL.,supra note 277, at 400-01.
280. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of a "liability rule" rather
than a "property rule" in these cases).
281. See supra note Part 1I.C.3.
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in all cases, regardless of use or reasonably foreseeable use, with the only
remaining question being the value of the property for purposes of de-
termining just compensation.8 2
1. Limited Private Property Rights in the Subsurface
As shown above, numerous courts have held that a surface owner's
interest in the subsurface is "limited" at best, relying on Causby and oth-
er cases limiting the surface owner's rights to control the airspace. 83 Ar-
guably, even if states expressly provide by statute that a surface owner
has a property right in the pore space, as Wyoming, North Dakota, and
Montana have done, such a state-created property interest may be lim-
ited by the judicial application of Causby to subsurface rights that places
"objective" limits on rights to the subsurface.8 4 In other words, the ar-
gument would be that just as Wyoming could not vest in surface owners
the right to the airspace far above their property as a result of the objec-
tive, background principles expressed in Causby, Wyoming cannot vest
in surface owners the right to the deep subsurface as a result of courts'
application of Causby to the subsurface. 8
This argument would be consistent with a 2008 article by John
Sprankling in the UCLA Law Review entitled Owning the Center of the
Earth.286 In that article, Sprankling takes the position that private prop-
erty rights to land should not extend more than 300 meters (1000 feet)
below the surface of the earth, and the subsurface beneath that threshold
should belong to the federal government. 287 The article did not focus on
CCS specifically but instead focused on the issue of subsurface ownership
in connection with today's technological ability to develop various ener-
gy and climate change technologies, including CCS and enhanced geo-
thermal systems, that must make use of the subsurface in ways not con-
templated in the past.28 Sprankling contends that based on case law
involving subsurface water, oil and gas development, and hazardous
waste injection, among others, American law has never determined
whether a landowner's rights extend more than two miles below the sur-
face and that even case law within two miles of the surface is largely in-
consistent. 9 He then concludes that property owners should have some
rights below the surface to accommodate foundations, trees, and other
282. With the third option, for many properties just compensation may be zero because there is
no value lost to the surface owner. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003)
(holding that the state's taking of private property did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the
value of the property, measured by the owner's pecuniary loss, was zero).
283. See, e.g., Chance v. BP Chems. Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996); supra Part II.
284. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2008); Chance,
670 N.E.2d at 992; see also supra notes 131-39.
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. Sprankling, supra note 17.
287. Id. at 982.
288. Id. at 1029-32.
289. Id. at 1020.
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normal surface facilities, but those rights should not extend more than
1000 feet below the surface. 2° Following that argument, Congress could
enact legislation declaring a "public highway" in the subsurface at a spec-
ified depth below the surface of the earth just as has been done with nav-
igable airspace.2 91 Such action could establish a system for compensating
for existing uses of the subsurface below that depth (or existing rights or
leases that have already been conveyed) and cut off the establishment of
future private property rights and expectations going forward. 29 While
such an approach would certainly facilitate the development of CCS by
reducing acquisition costs associated with subsurface pore space, it would
almost just as certainly invite takings challenges, creating uncertainty
surrounding total costs of CCS implementation and leaving the issue for
the courts.
2. Property Rights in the Subsurface Based on Existing Use and
Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
While limiting subsurface property rights has appeal as a means to
facilitate new technologies like CCS, it arguably fails to recognize the
realities of how the subsurface has historically been used and is used to-
day. As discussed in Part III, in many regions of the country, subsurface
property rights below 1000 feet are used, bought, sold, condemned, and
valued. Underground activities at depths below 1000 feet, or roughly 300
meters, include coal production; oil and natural gas exploration, produc-
tion, and storage; produced waters injection; hazardous and municipal
waste water injection; and potentially aquifer storage and recovery and
compressed air storage.2 93 Congress has chosen to implicitly recognize
those property rights under some circumstances through the eminent
domain provisions of the Natural Gas Act, and courts have recognized
those rights by allowing for claims of trespass and nuisance in cases of ac-
tual interference or harm.294 Courts also have created mechanisms to de-
termine just compensation when subsurface areas are needed for a public
use such as natural gas storage.295 Thus, the country's history of the use
of the subsurface is in fact different than its use of airspace.
Moreover, there is a two-fold problem with a declaration that sur-
face owners have no more property rights in the deep subsurface than
they have in airspace. First, even though there may be federal back-
ground principles (e.g., Causby) that would prevent the vesting of prop-
290. Id. at 1026-28, 1031.
291. See 42 U.S.C. § 171 (2006).
292. Sprankling does recognize the potential need to acknowledge and honor "all existing rights
to extract specific valuable minerals, at least to the extent appropriate to ensure a reasonable return
on prior investments." Sprankling, supra note 17, at 1037-38.
293. See supra Part I.B.
294. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
295. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, 962 F.2d
1192, 1199 (6th Cir. 1992).
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erty rights in the airspace other than those used in connection with the
surface, the same is far less true with regard to the subsurface. 29 To date
there has been no federal declaration of a "public highway" in the sub-
surface as there has been with airspace, and any future declaration along
those lines would come into conflict with vested economic interests in the
subsurface in many areas of the country.2" Economic use of the subsur-
face may end at a certain depth, for instance, any deeper than necessary
for existing and future natural gas storage, waste injection, and oil and
gas exploration. But to the extent that CO 2 sequestration will be at
depths that are currently subject to existing or reasonably foreseeable
economic use (and it appears that it will be), 298 there do not appear to be
any background principles of statutory or common law that would pre-
vent states from vesting those property rights in surface owners or min-
eral owners if they choose to do so, or preventing courts from recogniz-
ing such rights as a matter of common law or constitutional law.299
Second, to the extent CO2 sequestration occurs at the same depths
and in the same locations as natural gas or other storage, there may be
circumstances where the surface owner (or mineral owner) can no longer
use the subsurface for any other economic purpose. When analyzing a
physical taking, the size and scope of the physical invasion is immaterial
to whether a taking has occurred. 0 ° Thus, some precedent would appear
to support the idea that CO2 sequestration, at least at depths that are at
the same level as existing uses or those uses subject to reasonable, in-
vestment-backed expectations (for instance, a property owner with a
state or federal permit to develop or use the deep subsurface for natural
gas storage or waste injection but where the activity has not yet oc-
curred) would interfere with a protectable property interest. 1 This ar-
gument would be even stronger in states like Wyoming that have ex-
pressly vested subsurface pore space rights in the surface owner or the
mineral owner.
An approach based on existing and reasonably foreseeable subsur-
face uses would likely result in the existence of subsurface property
rights in some regions of the country but not in others, based on whether
the geology is suitable for CO2 sequestration and whether that might
compete with oil and gas development, natural gas storage, and the like.
296. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (looking to "background prin-
ciples" of the state's law of property and nuisance as an exception to the per se takings rule for regula-
tions that deprive a landowner of all economic use of property); Bair v. United States, 515 F.3d 1323,
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (recognizing that "state-created property interests may be limited by federal
laws" and that federal law can constitute "background principles" that can prevent a per se takings
claim).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 293-95 (discussing difference in historic use of airspace
and historic use of subsurface).
298. See supra Part II.
299. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (discussing "background principles").
300. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322
(2002).
301. See, e.g., id.
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Recognizing subsurface property rights based on existing and reasonably
foreseeable use would provide a middle ground approach to property
rights that makes CCS somewhat more expensive to implement but
would also recognize, value, and compensate for competing economic
uses, both those in existence and those that are subject to reasonable, in-
vestment-backed expectations. Under such an approach, CCS legislation
could create a presumption of no property interest in the deep subsur-
face, but allow property owners to rebut that presumption with evidence
of existing uses or reasonable, investment-backed expectations to estab-
lish a property interest.3
3. Expansive Private Property Rights in the Subsurface
Last, an approach that applies Loretto squarely to subsurface prop-
erty rights could arguably result in a determination that all surface own-
ers (or in some cases mineral owners) have a private interest in subsur-
face pore space. Such a property interest would not be limited by the
amount of space at issue, whether the owner had used the space in the
past, or whether there are reasonably foreseeable future uses."3 Instead,
existing and reasonably foreseeable use would be relevant only in deter-
mining the amount of just compensation due.3°' As a legislative matter,
this would be similar to what Congress has done with the Natural Gas
Act, namely, assuming the existence of private property in the subsurface
that operators must acquire through contractual agreements or by emi-
nent domain with payment of just compensation. This would likely result
in more money needed to acquire the pore space necessary for CO2 se-
questration and an administrative structure to address a larger number of
claims than would exist under the other two options because there will be
more potential claimants. The nature and extent of the money and infra-
structure necessary will depend on how widely CCS is deployed and how
central it becomes to our future approach to limiting GHG emissions.
On balance though, the case for a direct application of Loretto to the
subsurface, without any of the qualifications and limitations that exist in
the case law governing trespass associated with oil and gas and waste in-
jection operations, seems to expand property rights in the deep subsur-
face beyond what is legally supportable or necessary to protect existing
subsurface interests. Indeed, it is possible to theorize that just as Causby
confirmed that federal legislation cut off property interests in the higher
airspace, legislation authorizing the use of the deep subsurface for CO2
sequestration could similarly cut off property interests in the deep sub-
302. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 194, at 1 (proposing a regulatory structure for CO2 sequestra-
tion that provides notice and a window of time for property owners to assert claims associated with
existing or near-term economic use of the subsurface but that any interests not asserted within that
time frame be subject to CO 2 storage without compensation).
303. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,436-38 (1982).
304. For a discussion of approaches to determine value and just compensation, see infra Part
III.C.
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surface, except in connection with those uses that are currently in exis-
tence or subject to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.
III. CO 2 SEQUESTRATION AND TAKINGS
Now that we have explored a range of options with regard to defin-
ing property rights in Part II, we turn in this Part to the issue of takings.
Even under the most restrictive option with regard to recognizing subsur-
face property rights discussed in Part II, any widespread implementation
of CCS will likely implicate at least some protectable property interests
in the portions of the country where there are existing economic uses of
the subsurface at depths where CO2 sequestration is proposed. Building
off that premise, this Part discusses a range of issues relating to physical
takings and regulatory takings in the context of subsurface CO 2 seques-
tration. With regard to a physical taking, as explained in Part II, the first
question is whether the landowner (or mineral owner) has a sufficient in-
terest in the subsurface pore space to implicate the Takings Clause. 05
Assuming that is the case, a physical taking could occur if a private or
government CCS operator (1) injects CO 2 directly into the subsurface
underlying the owner's property for permanent sequestration or (2) in-
jects the CO 2 nearby in such a manner that CO2 or displaced brine mi-
grates and permanently invades the pore space underlying the landown-
er's property. Under those circumstances, a court would be called on to
determine whether such actions constitute a permanent, physical occupa-
tion of that property, which would require just compensation for any re-
duction in property value. As for regulatory takings, there may be some
circumstances where there is no physical injection of CO 2 under the land-
owner's property and no migration from a neighboring sequestration ba-
sin, but the federal or state regulatory authority has enacted regulations
that prevent the landowner or mineral owner from conducting a range of
subsurface operations relating to oil and gas development or natural gas
storage in order to ensure the integrity of a nearby CO2 sequestration ba-
sin. Section A considers the issue of physical takings, and Section B ad-
dresses regulatory takings.
A. Physical Takings
To the extent there are at least limited private property rights in
subsurface pore space, any action by the government or private parties to
inject and sequester large amounts of CO2 in that pore space could be a
per se physical taking requiring just compensation. In Loretto v. Manhat-
tan CATV Corp., the Court held that a state law requiring landlords to
allow television cable companies to place cable facilities in their apart-
ment buildings constituted a taking, even though the facilities occupied
305. See supra Part II.
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at most only one and one-half cubic feet of the landlord's property.3" In
its analysis, the Court found the cable legislation's purpose-to promote
rapid development of communication-was in the public interest, but
held that the state action authorizing the permanent invasion of private
land by a third party so frustrated the property interest that a taking had
occurred. 3°7 Even though the just compensation owed to the plaintiff was
ultimately determined to be only one dollar, 0 the decision is significant
in its ruling that any regulation that results in a permanent physical inva-
sion or occupation, no matter how small and without regard to the own-
er's historic use of the property, constitutes a per se taking.3" Moreover,
both before and after Loretto, the Court has distinguished between a
"permanent" physical invasion, which will always constitute a taking, and
a temporary physical invasion, which will sometimes (but not always)
constitute a taking.3 10
The Court has held many things to be a physical intrusion on land
(e.g., telephone lines, pipes, and rails), but these are typically concrete
invasions of the surface estate."' Likewise, in the context of water rights,
the Court has found in some circumstances that diversion of water onto
or away from the plaintiffs' property to accomplish public purposes-
such as supporting the war effort or building dams-can constitute a per
se physical taking requiring just compensation.' Is the injection and se-
306. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438.
307. Id. at 425.
308. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 435 (N.Y. 1983) (sus-
taining compensation for the taking at one dollar).
309. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437-38.
310. Id. at 428 ("Since these early cases, this Court has consistently distinguished between flood-
ing cases involving a permanent physical occupation, on the one hand, and cases involving a more
temporary invasion, or government action outside the owner's property that causes consequential
damages within, on the other. A taking has always been found only in the former situation."); see also
City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 99 (1893) (holding the installation of telephone
poles are in the public interest but noting that the action "effectually and permanently dispossesses the
general public as if it had destroyed that amount of ground"); McKay v. United States, 199 F.3d 1376,
1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the installation by federal agencies of groundwater monitoring
wells extending into the plaintiffs' mineral estate for several years interfered with their mining pros-
pects because it was a physical occupation of private property by the government, and distinguishing
other cases involving test hole borings which did not interfere with the mineral estate and were dis-
crete, transitory invasions rather than a permanent invasion).
311. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430 ("Later cases, relying on the character of a physical occupation,
clearly establish that permanent occupations of land by such installations as telegraph and telephone
lines, rails, and underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial
amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his land.").
312. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620-21 (1963) (holding that federal construction of dam
that resulted in diversion of plaintiffs' riparian water rights used for irrigation was a physical taking);
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752 (1950) (same); Int'l Paper Co. v. United
States; 282 U.S. 399, 404-05, 408 (1931) (holding U.S. requisition order diverting all the hydroelectric
power of the Niagara Falls Power Company to increase power production for third-party use in con-
nection with war effort constituted a taking of water from International Paper, which had a lease for a
portion of that water). But see Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1908)
(holding that New Jersey statute that barred a company with riparian water rights from diverting water
was not a taking because state law did not create any rights to the diversion). Outside the context of
land, the Court has found that a state requirement that interest on certain lawyer trust accounts be
[Vol. 2010
No. 2] CARBON SEQUESTRATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 411
questration of CO2 in the deep subsurface comparable to these other
physical occupations? Certainly, the occupation of the subsurface ap-
pears to be "permanent" in that there is an expectation the CO2 will re-
main in the subsurface for hundreds to thousands of years. On the other
hand, following the reasoning of the secondary recovery and under-
ground waste injection cases, one can argue that placing an odorless, co-
lorless gas nearly a mile below the surface is less like the tangible, physi-
cal invasion of a cable wire, telephone line, or water, and is therefore less
likely to so completely "frustrate" the owner's interest in either the sur-
face or mineral estate in the absence of actual harm. The rejoinder to
that, of course, is that storage of massive amounts of CO2 below the sur-
face of earth may pose different risks, and certainly more uncertain risks,
to surface owners than does the more tangible placement of various
cables, telephone lines, or impounded water on the surface.
Ultimately, the question may come down to the property owner's
reasonable expectations with regard to the subsurface. Currently, there
is no reasonable expectation among property owners that they can con-
trol the airspace far above their property as they can the surface of their
property. Is the same true with regard to the subsurface? For many
property owners, it is, as they have never expected to use and control the
subsurface in the same way as the surface of their property. For other
surface and mineral owners, however, they are already making economic
use of the subsurface at the same depths as proposed CO2 sequestration,
or such uses are subject to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.
These property owners may have stronger arguments to support a claim
that there is a physical taking of those rights if the government acts to
place CO2 in that subsurface in perpetuity.
Likewise, a surface owner or mineral owner affected not by the in-
jected CO2, but by the associated displaced brines from nearby CO2 se-
questration, might have a similar physical takings claim. In such a case,
however, the owner may need to show actual or reasonably foreseeable
interference with use of the subsurface, and that the displaced brines are
sufficiently tied to the government authorization or are a reasonably fo-
reseeable consequence of the government action. 313 While the Court has
found the permanent flooding of the surface to be a physical taking,3 14 it
is unclear whether the same analysis would apply to underground flood-
ing or migration of subsurface waters, particularly based on the oil and
gas and underground waste injection cases discussed in Part II. Thus,
where such an invasion from nearby CO2 sequestration operations occurs
and where no economically valuable resources are affected, there may be
no physical taking. If, however, displaced brines actually interfere with
transferred to a foundation for law-related charitable and educational purposes was a physical taking
akin to the rooftop space taken in Loretto. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003).
313. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos & Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered, and Sequential, State and Lo-
cal Barriers to Extractive Resource Development, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 26-29 (2004).
314. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
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existing and reasonably foreseeable subsurface operations, such an inva-
sion may constitute a physical taking, resulting in just compensation as
well as any actual damages. As mentioned above, Congress could estab-
lish a presumption that CO 2 sequestration does not constitute a physical
taking but then give property owners the opportunity to rebut that pre-
sumption by showing interference with actual economic use of the sub-
surface or interference with reasonable, investment-backed expectations
with regard to the subsurface.
B. Regulatory Takings
As stated earlier, even if there is no physical occupation of private
property, a regulatory taking can occur if government regulation places
too great a burden on the owner's use of the property. A regulatory tak-
ing can take place under two circumstances. First, a regulatory action
can be a per se taking just like a physical occupation when the regulation
completely deprives an owner of all reasonably beneficial use of her
property.315 In the absence of a complete deprivation of all economic use
of the property, courts generally consider whether the regulatory restric-
tion has risen to the level of a compensable taking under the multifactor
balancing test set out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,316 which considers (1) the character of the government action;
(2) the severity of the economic impact; and (3) the extent to which the
regulation interferes with the property owner's distinct, "investment-
backed" expectations.317
Although it is uncertain at this point what regulations governing
subsurface CO 2 sequestration will look like, it is highly likely that CCS
implementation will be accompanied by regulations prohibiting certain
activities that might interfere with the safety and permanent sequestra-
tion of CO 2 in a given basin. Notably, surface and mineral estate owners
both within the sequestration basin area and near the basin area might be
limited in their ability to drill through the confining layer in such a way
that penetrates or compromises the CO2 sequestration area. Thus, the
first question is whether such a regulatory prohibition would deprive a
surface owner or mineral owner of all economic value of the property. If
not, the next question is whether under the Penn Central balancing test
the extent of the deprivation unreasonably interferes with the owner's
distinct, investment-backed expectations for economic use of that prop-
erty.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the nature of
the property interest. If a court were to determine that the pore space is
315. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (holding regulations that pro-
hibit all economically beneficial use of land require compensation just as if it were a permanent physi-
cal occupation of land).
316. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
317. Id. at 124.
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a property interest separate and distinct from either the surface interest
or the mineral interest, it would be possible to conclude that regulations
restricting use of or access to that pore space would be a complete depri-
vation of economic use, resulting in a per se taking.3"8 The Supreme
Court precedent in this area is somewhat mixed, particularly in the area
of subsurface rights that have arisen with regard to the regulation of coal
mining operations.
For instance, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,"9 the plaintiffs
owned the surface rights under their home but not the mineral rights,
which had been severed and conveyed to the defendant coal company.32
A state law, the Kohler Act, prohibited the mining of anthracite coal
within city limits in such a manner as would cause the subsidence of any
dwelling or other building.3 21 When the plaintiffs sued to enjoin further
mining of coal under their property pursuant to the Kohler Act, the de-
fendant contended application of the law amounted to an unconstitu-
tional taking of its property (the coal) without just compensation.322 In
an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court found that application of the
law was a taking.3 23 In reaching the decision, Justice Holmes balanced
the extent of the defendant's deprivation against the private interest of
the homeowners rather than the state's interest in preventing a public
nuisance, which had been a defense to similar regulatory takings claims
in the past.324 The Court found that the extent of the deprivation was
"great" because the law purported to abolish the entire "support" estate
in coal-a separately defined estate under state law. 25 The Court con-
cluded with its now-famous line, stating that "while property may be re-
gulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking. 326
Several decades later, however, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 27 the Court revisited the issue of subsurface takings re-
lated to the regulation of coal mining in Pennsylvania, but reached a dif-
ferent result. In Keystone Bituminous, coal companies challenged the
Pennsylvania Subsidence Act, which required 50 percent of the coal be-
318. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
319. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
320. Id. at 394-95.
321. Id. at 412-13.
322. Id. at 412.
323. Id. at 414 ("To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.").
324. Id. at 413 (focusing on the fact that this is a case "of a single private house" and not a public
nuisance); id. at 417-18 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that Kohler Act did not work an unconstitu-
tional taking of property because the restriction "is merely the prohibition of a noxious use" and citing
precedent that such legislation is not a taking even if it deprives the owner of all economic use of the
property).
325. Id. at 414; JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 989 (6th ed. 2006) ("Pennsylvania law re-
cognizes three separate estates in mining property: in the surface, in the minerals, and in support of the
surface.").
326. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
327. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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neath surface structures to be left in place to provide surface support. 328
In finding that the law did not result in an unconstitutional taking, the
Court distinguished Mahon and applied the Penn Central balancing
test.329 In finding that Mahon did not apply, the Court focused on the
important public purpose of the law in promoting public health and safe-
ty and found that when balanced against the extent of deprivation, the
regulation did not go "too far" and did not result in a taking. 330
More important, departing from Mahon, the Court refused to con-
sider the support estate as a separate estate in property in determining
the extent of the deprivation.31 The Court found that the 27 million tons
of coal owned by the plaintiffs that would need to be left in place under
the law did not "constitute a separate segment of property for takings
law purposes.13 2 Instead, the regulation limiting the extraction of coal
was no different than a requirement that a building occupy no more than
a specific percentage of the lot on which it is located; zoning setback re-
quirements; the Court's decision in Penn Central itself, which refused to
sever the company's "air rights" from the remainder of its property; or
other restrictions in the public interest that place limits on the property
owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his or her
property. 3 3 Relying on the lower court's decision, the Court reasoned
that even though Pennsylvania law recognized the support estate as a
separate property interest, that estate could not be used profitably by
one who does not also possess either the mineral estate or the surface es-
tate, and thus it must be considered together with those other estates for
purposes of conducting the takings analysis. 34
Since the decision in Keystone Bituminous, the Court has continued
to struggle with how to define property interests for purposes of deter-
mining whether a regulation works a complete elimination of economic
use of property resulting in a per se taking, as well as for determining the
extent of deprivation under the Penn Central balancing test. 33 In Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,3 6 the Court announced its controver-
sial per se regulatory takings rule in cases where the government denies
all economic use of property unless "background principles" of nuisance
and property law would have precluded the activity in question. 337 Since
Lucas, however, the Supreme Court and lower courts generally have de-
clined to apply the per se regulatory takings rule. Instead, courts either
328. Id. at 476-77.
329. Id. at 481-82.
330. Id. at 485-93.
331. Id. at 501.
332. Id. at 498.
333. Id. at 498-99.
334. Id. at 501.
335. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 325, at 989, 1022 (discussing continuing uncertainty over the
idea of "conceptual severance" in regulatory takings jurisprudence).
336. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
337. Id. at 1028-32.
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have declined to sever property interests in space or time in a way that
would result in a denial of all economic value of the property, or relied
on the "background principles" exception in Lucas to uphold the regula-
tion in question. 38 In sum, although the Court has been less than consis-
tent in its approach to this issue, the trend among courts in recent years
appears to be away from allowing the property owner to define discrete
rights in property in either time or space in a way that favors per se regu-
latory takings claims.
In the context of CO 2 sequestration, it would appear to be very dif-
ficult for a surface owner or mineral owner to show that a regulatory re-
striction or even outright prohibition on deep subsurface use would elim-
inate all economically beneficial use of the property and result in a per se
regulatory taking under Lucas. With regard to severance, while the au-
thority in the area would seem to argue against the idea that a "pore es-
tate" could be reasonably severed from the rest of the surface or mineral
estate for purposes of a federal takings analysis, state laws in Montana
and Wyoming now allow for such severance. 39 For extraction opera-
tions, the pore space contains the extractable resource. This relationship
is not unlike that in Keystone Bituminous, where the Court determined
the support estate had value only with regard to its relation to the other
estates. 40 Although recent lower courts have split over whether coal bed
methane gas is part of the coal estate or the surface estate, all courts have
held it to be part of one or the other, at least with regard to disputes be-
tween surface owners and mineral owners." Indeed, even if one accepts
severability for related resources that can be physically separated, it is
even more difficult to assert that the pore space should be separated
338. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
(holding that moratorium imposed on development as part of land use planning was not a per se tak-
ing on grounds that after moratorium was lifted, claimants could pursue their development rights);
Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that city's denial of a
shoreline development permit application was not a taking based on the "background principles" of
Washington law, which restricted the type of development at issue under the public trust doctrine);
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005) (finding
that state's denial of permit to fill eighteen acres of salt marsh was not a per se taking based on back-
ground principles of state law including the public trust doctrine); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 325, at 1022 (finding that state courts generally appear to reject conceptual severance and instead
consider the impact of land use regulation on a property owner's entire parcel rather than its impact
on just the regulated part, but noting that the Court of Federal Claims and Federal Circuit often tend
to go in the opposite direction); Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The
Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 325-26
(2005) (discussing Lucas and arguing that courts have interpreted the "background principles" of
nuisance and property law expansively to avoid per se regulatory takings claims).
339. See supra Table 1.
340. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501 (1987).
341. Compare Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 687 (Mont. 1995) (hold-
ing that coalbed methane was not a constituent part of the coal), Harrison-Wyatt LLC v. Ratliff, 593
S.E.2d 234, 238 (Va. 2004), and Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 545 (Wyo. 2002) (hold-
ing CBM was not a mineral mined in association with coal but rather a separate process), with Vines v.
McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305, 1308 (Ala. 1993). See also Laitos & Getches, supra note
313, at 6.
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from the rock formation as there quite literally is no "pore" without the
surrounding rock.
If, however, the surface estate and mineral estate are in separate
ownership, and restrictions on use of the subsurface completely prohibit
the ability of a mineral owner to access or use the entire mineral estate,
that would appear to provide a better basis for arguing that the regula-
tion has resulted in a reduction of all economic value of the mineral
owner's property. Thus, the impact of the regulation on the mineral
owner will be critical. If the mineral owner's property interest is limited,
and the regulation eliminates its economic value entirely, there might be
a per se takings claim under Lucas. On the other hand, if the mineral
owner's subsurface holdings are extensive, as was the case in Keystone
Bituminous, it is more likely that a court would use a Penn Central ba-
lancing test rather than finding a per se taking. In sum, it is unlikely a
court would find that restrictions on subsurface use and exploration for
purposes of preserving the integrity of the CO, reservoir would consti-
tute a per se taking, except in the case where the regulations completely
prevent a mineral owner from accessing all of her mineral holdings.
If regulations protecting the CO2 reservoir are found to deprive a
surface or mineral owner of some but not all of the economic value of the
surface or mineral estate, courts will then conduct a takings analysis us-
ing the Penn Central balancing factors: (1) the character of the govern-
ment action; (2) the severity of the economic impact; and (3) the extent
to which the regulation interferes with the property owner's distinct, "in-
vestment-backed" expectations.342 With regard to the character of the
government action, the purpose of any regulation meant to protect the
integrity of the CO 2 sequestration basin would be to facilitate the de-
ployment of a critical technology to address climate change. The regula-
tions would also be intended to promote public health and safety by en-
suring that stored CO 2 does not cause harm to resources outside the se-
questration area or escape into the atmosphere and cause harm to
human health or nearby surface and subsurface resources.
As to the severity of the economic impact, it remains uncertain pre-
cisely how the use of pore space and the surrounding area will be allo-
cated and regulated. It is likely, however, that surface owners and min-
eral owners may be limited or prohibited from drilling through a
confining layer in a way that punctures or compromises the sequestration
area. 3 For some property owners, these restrictions will have a minimal
impact on their existing or reasonably foreseeable surface or subsurface
operations, but for others, the impact may result in additional restrictions
or costs.
342. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1977).
343. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 82-3-1100-82-3-311a (proposed Jan. 2009) (regulations for
the underground storage of CO2 that include provisions on permitting, monitoring, and leakage report-
ing, as well as requirements for drilling through a CO2 storage facility); see also supra Table 1.
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Finally, the weight of the third factor-interference with reasonable,
investment-backed expectations-will depend in large part on the extent
to which the surface owner or mineral owner currently makes use of the
subsurface or could reasonably expect to do so in the future.3" Those
owners already using the pore space for underground waste injection or
natural gas storage may have a cognizable investment-backed expecta-
tion free from CCS-related regulation, whereas the vast majority of sur-
face owners will have a difficult time establishing current or even plausi-
ble uses for the pore space a kilometer underground that is harmed by
future CCS-related regulations. More important, this issue comes down
to not only the landowner's existing or reasonably foreseeable use of the
property, but also the landowner's expectations at the time of the pur-
chase or investment with regard to using that space free of CCS or other
related regulation. Like all takings issues considered under the Penn
Central balancing test, this will be a factually intensive inquiry, taking in-
to account the time of purchase, the expectations at that time, and
whether those expectations were reasonable.
Ultimately, unless a court finds there is a deprivation of all econom-
ic use of the property, it is unlikely a court would find that regulations re-
stricting some portion of the surface or subsurface would constitute a
taking under the Penn Central balancing factors. This would be in large
part because of the critical importance of addressing climate change as
well as the important public health and safety concerns associated with
preventing the re-release of CO, into the atmosphere after injection. In
any particular case, however, there is the possibility that if regulatory re-
strictions interfere substantially with existing uses of the surface or sub-
surface, a court may find that the extent of deprivation is so great as to
constitute a taking on grounds that the regulation has gone "too far" and
the government must pay its way.345
C. Just Compensation and Determining Value
As noted earlier, even if a court finds that the government has taken
private property, there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment unless the
taking is without payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court has
held that "just compensation required by the Fifth Amendment is meas-
ured by the property owner's loss rather than the government's gain." 3"
As Justice Holmes has stated, "[T]he question is what has the owner lost,
344. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
345. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) ("[Wlhile property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if any regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." (quoting Pa.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1992))).
346. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003) (internal quotations omitted);
see also United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 404 (1949) ("We
take it that in the valuation of readily salable articles, price at the market nearest the taking is, at least
in the usual case, a practical rule of thumb, and one that is most likely to place the claimant in the pe-
cuniary position he occupied before the taking.").
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not what has the taker gained. ''M7 As a result, if a court determines that
the economic loss to the owner is zero, the compensation is also zero and
there is no taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Assessing the
value or worth for any specific item of property, however, can be a diffi-
cult enterprise. As a result the Court generally has used a more practical
measure in the form of the concept of "fair market value," or "what a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller," even though this
measure "does not necessarily compensate for all values an owner may
derive from his property." 39 In other words, if there is a prevailing mar-
ket price at the time of the taking,350 that price is just compensation. 5'
Fair market value is also recognized as a way to strike a fair "balance be-
tween the public's need and the claimant's loss" in takings cases.352
The Court, however, "has refused to designate market value as the
sole measure of just compensation,"'3 53 and even in cases where there is
an established market, there is not necessarily a fixed method for deter-
mining the market value.354 Although the best evidence of market value
may be recent sales, courts also have found that any "fair and non-
discriminatory" method of determining a "fair and realistic value" is ac-
ceptable.3 5 While the fair market value measure becomes somewhat
problematic when there is no willing seller in a takings case, it becomes
even more problematic in the situation where there is not only no willing
seller but also no established market at all.356 Thus, the Court has recog-
nized that in some circumstances, it simply may be impossible to deter-
mine a market value, particularly in cases where there have been too few
sales to credibly predict a future price. 35 7
Turning once again to eminent domain actions brought under the
Natural Gas Act, determining just compensation in those cases is often
347. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
348. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 237.
349. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (internal quotations omit-
ted).
350. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ("That equivalent is the market value of the
property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in money."); see also Yancey v. United
States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Fair market value under the Fifth Amendment is nor-
mally ascertained at the date the governmental restrictions are imposed, which is the date of the tak-
ing.").
351. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341,344 (1923).
352. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 512 (internal quotations omitted).
353. Id.
354. Allied Corp. v. Town of Camillus, 604 N.E.2d 1348, 1350 (N.Y. 1992).
355. Id. ("The ultimate purpose of valuation, whether in eminent domain or tax certiorari pro-
ceedings, is to arrive at a fair and realistic value of the property involved so that all property owners
contribute equitably to the public fisc. Any fair and nondiscriminating method that will achieve that
result is acceptable." (citations omitted)).
356. United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 407 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Resort to the conventional formulas for ascertaining just compensation
for the taking of property rarely bought and sold, and having therefore no recognized market value,
does not yield fruitful results. The variables are too many to permit of anything except an informed
judgment.")
357. Id. at 402 (majority opinion).
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difficult because subsurface gas storage rights are not commonly traded
on the public market in the same way as surface rights."8 As a result,
comparative sales and other valuation methods are difficult to determine.
In one Ohio case, Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural
Gas Storage Easement,359 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that state law governing just compensation should ap-
ply to federal condemnation of natural gas storage easements."6 In so
finding, the court paid particular attention to the express language in the
Natural Gas Act 361 that directs federal courts to look to the practice and
procedure of the state in which the property parcel is located.362 More
generally, the court also asserted that the presumption that state law
should be incorporated into federal law is heightened when parties "have
entered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights and obli-
gations would be governed by state-law standards. '363
When the issue of just compensation was certified to the Supreme
Court of Ohio, the state court adopted the federal district court's instruc-
tions to the condemnation commission regarding the factors to be taken
into account when setting just compensation. 364  These factors were
(1) comparable sales (if available);3 65 (2) any probable revenues to the
landowner associated with commercially recoverable natural gas under
the property; (3) the fair market value of the storage easement based
upon a capitalization of retail income from the right to store gas;
(4) depreciation in the fair market value of the condemned tract as a
whole by reason of the taking of the storage easement; (5) the existence
of any mineral leases on the property; and (6) the value of the property
from the landowner's perspective (not the value of the storage easement
to the natural gas company). 366
The judicial principles governing just compensation in general, and
for subsurface natural gas storage in particular, could guide any valuation
of CO 2 sequestration areas in potential eminent domain actions for own-
ers with a protectable property interest. If evidence of comparable sales
358. McGrew, supra note 262, at 154.
359. 962 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1992).
360. Id. at 1199.
361. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2006) ("The practice and procedure in any action or proceeding for that
purpose in the district court of the United States shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice
and procedure in similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is sit-
uated....").
362. Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 1197.
363. Id. at 1196 (citations omitted).
364. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, 620 N.E.2d
48,49-50 (Ohio 1993).
365. It was reported that in 1993, "Columbia routinely paid four dollars per acre per year for the
right to store gas beneath a property" while the East Ohio Gas Company paid "five dollars per acre
per year." McGrew, supra note 262, at 153. These transactions are rentals and thus must be converted
and reduced to present value in cases where the gas company wishes to obtain a permanent easement.
Moreover, because there is no real market for this property other than gas storage, the gas company
essentially has a monopoly, which casts doubt on these amounts as fair market value. Id.
366. Columbia Gas, 620 N.E.2d at 49-50.
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or rental payments are not easy to identify, as is likely with regard to the
right to sequester CO 2 hundreds or thousands of feet underground, par-
ties will look to other factors to establish just compensation. For in-
stance, a landowner who can establish the existence of commercially re-
coverable resources may attempt to calculate the probable revenues and
costs of extracting the resource to determine just compensation,367 al-
though this approach is somewhat controversial because future revenues
often are thought to be too speculative.3" More specifically the Court
has held that elements affecting value that depend upon events or occur-
rences which, "while within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown
to be reasonably probable, should be excluded from consideration, for
that would be to allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a
guide for the ascertainment of value."369 Avoiding such speculation and
conjecture in just compensation valuation has since come to be known as
the "reasonable possibility" or "reasonable probability" standard.3 70
Parties also may show a depreciation or loss in the whole property
value due to the taking at issue, a measure commonly used in partial tak-
ings cases.371 For instance, "[i]n general, the ultimate measure of the
permanent damages sustained by an owner from the establishment of a
pipeline easement across his premises is the difference between the fair
market value of the whole premises immediately before the taking and
the fair market value thereof immediately afterward. 3 72 One complica-
tion with this method for both partial and complete takings situations is
that the mere announcement of government intent to regulate or con-
demn can affect the property value before the taking.173 In some cases,
this can lead to "condemnation blight," which often occurs when a gov-
ernmental entity announces its intent to condemn property for a park, a
road, or other development, resulting in a dramatic reduction of the
property's marketability.374 By the time the government condemns the
project years later, "its fair market value will be significantly less than if
the government had never [undertaken] the project in the first place. 3 75
In other cases, however, the government's announcement of its intent to
condemn can result in an increase in property values, such as when a new
367. Id. at 49 (noting that the full amount must also be reduced by the interest enjoyed by a one-
time payment).
368. See McGrew, supra note 262, at 156.
369. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934).
370. See, e.g., St. Genevieve Gas Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 747 F.2d 1411, 1413 (11th Cir. 1984).
371. See McGrew, supra note 262, at 158-59.
372. Am. La. Pipe Line Co. v. Kennerk, 144 N.E.2d 660, 665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (recognizing
that in Ohio there is a distinction between damages and compensation).
373. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory
Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 677, 696-99 (2005) (discussing how the prospect of an imminent govern-
ment eminent domain action can have either a positive or a negative effect on the value of the proper-
ty subject to condemnation).
374. Id. at 696-97.
375. Id. at 697.
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road will be constructed that will increase property values in the area. 376
The question then becomes whether the government must pay for that
increase in value at the time of the actual condemnation. At least twen-
ty-nine states have enacted valuation laws that outline how to calculate
the timing of the taking and the property value before and after the tak-
ing."' Notably, some of the laws are written to require an adjustment in
valuation recognizing the impact of the government announcement to
condemn or regulate.37 1
In the context of an eminent domain action to acquire subsurface
pore space for CO2 sequestration, the "timing of condemnation" issue
could potentially increase or decrease the value of the property. With
regard to subsurface pore space already in economic use for oil and gas
operations, natural gas storage, or other economic use, an eminent do-
main announcement could reduce the market value of the subsurface
property for these existing economic uses. On the other hand, with re-
gard to subsurface pore space not already in economic use (or reasonably
foreseeable economic use apart from CCS), an eminent domain an-
nouncement could increase the value of that subsurface property because
the announcement would create an economic use for that property and
other subsurface pore space in the area. This would be particularly true
if the eminent domain actions took place over numerous years and dur-
ing that time created market value for subsurface pore space for CO2 sto-
rage that did not exist prior to the initial set of actions.
Particularly in situations where the taking is something less than an
actual permanent, physical occupation, some courts have begun using the
concept of "option value" as a method of valuation for just compensation
purposes. 79 At least one state, New Jersey, has codified the concept, de-
fining just compensation for a temporary restriction to be the fair market
value of an option to purchase the land reserved for the period of reser-
vation.3 80 In so doing, the court assumes the state has taken an option to
buy the property from the landowner for the period of the taking and
then attempts to determine what a freely bargained-for option would
cost on the market. 81 This option value is similar to the price one would
pay for a negative covenant, or the requirement that the landowner re-
frain from activities on his land.382 In New Jersey, prior to codification of
the valuation principle, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the op-
376. Id. at 698.
377. Christopher A. Bauer, Note, Government Takings and Constitutional Guarantees: When Date
of Valuation Statutes Deny Just Compensation, 2003 BYU L. REV. 265, 278.
378. Id.
379. See, e.g., Jay Harris Rabin, Note, It's Not Just Compensation, It's a Theory of Valuation as
Well.' "Just Compensation" for Temporary Regulatory Takings, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 247, 257
(1989); see also J. Margaret Tretbar, Comment, Calculating Compensation for Temporary Regulatory
Takings, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 201,226-27 (1993).
380. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-44 (West 2008).
381. See Rabin, supra note 379, at 257.
382. Id. at 265.
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tion price should include, among other things, taxes accrued for the pe-
riod, and that the full "sum can be established by expert advice and opin-
ion." '383 Even in the case where the only loss the plaintiff can demon-
strate is the loss of selling prospects because of the restrictive zoning,
New Jersey courts have held that the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable
damages in the form of recovery of the option value, regardless of how
difficult it is to measure.384 Although CO 2 sequestration in most cases
will be permanent rather than temporary, the concept of option value
could be helpful in determining just compensation for subsurface pore
space. For instance, option value could be applied to regulatory takings
in the absence of condemnation proceedings if a court ever determined
that CCS regulatory measures deprived the owner of all beneficial use of
the property or the ability to sell the property to another party.385
Ultimately, to the extent CO 2 sequestration is sought in private sub-
surface areas in which there are already private commercial uses for nat-
ural gas storage, oil and gas development, or other uses, the costs of ob-
taining rights to the subsurface by eminent domain may be significant. In
other cases though, where the geologic formation is appropriate for CO2
sequestration but is not appropriate for other, existing commercial uses,
the costs associated with acquiring that property may be no more than
the one dollar ultimately awarded to the apartment owners in Loretto,3 86
or even zero.387 Thus, even if one assumes that all surface owners have
protectable property interests to the center of the earth, the amount of
compensation owed may be next to nothing or nothing in some of those
cases. As a result, there may well be a sliding scale of compensation for
subsurface pore space based not on the existence of a property right, but
on the value of that right based on the existing or reasonably foreseeable
uses of the pore space. One option is for Congress to create a presump-
tion regarding just compensation similar to that suggested above for de-
fining a property right in the first place. Thus, Congress could create a
presumption that subsurface pore space has no value, and consequently
no compensation is due, but give property owners the opportunity to re-
but that presumption by showing the economic value of the deep subsur-
face associated with existing uses or reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectations regarding use.
383. Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 237 A.2d 881,884 (N.J. 1968).
384. Sheerr v. Twp. of Evesham, 445 A.2d 46, 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
385. But see Rabin, supra note 379, at 259 (arguing that the option value method suffers from
some of the same difficulties as other valuation methods where the "market value for an option to
purchase a particular piece of undeveloped property is haunted by speculation and inaccuracies" and
courts wind up engaging in "a guessing game as to what a similarly bargained-for option would be
worth").
386. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 432-33 (N.Y. 1983).
A significant amount of CO2 sequestration could also take place on federal public lands in the west,
which presumably would avoid the costs of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment entirely.
387. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003) (holding that the state's taking
of private property did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the value of the property, measured
by the owner's pecuniary loss, was zero).
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IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND ACCESS TO SUBSURFACE PORE SPACE
If policymakers ultimately decide to encourage widespread de-
ployment of CCS to combat climate change, it will be important to con-
sider a federal regulatory structure to address subsurface pore space
access issues for CO2 sequestration projects. State regulation, while cer-
tainly possible, will have difficulty addressing problems related to seques-
tration under federal lands, sequestration in geologic basins that cross
state lines, and other interstate issues relating to the transport and injec-
tion of CO2 into the subsurface on the massive scale necessary to address
global climate change. Because of the government and private invest-
ment that will be necessary to create and implement such a regulatory
system, how much money CO2 operators or the government will actually
have to pay to obtain pore space and the complexity of the underlying
transactions are important questions.
As discussed in Part II, even under the most restrictive approach to
property rights, widespread implementation of CCS will likely interfere
with at least some protectable property interests in subsurface pore
space.3" To account for these cases, or an even greater number of cases
if policymakers or courts opt for a more expansive approach to subsur-
face property rights, policymakers should implement a federal process
for resolving these claims. To do so, Congress can create a regulatory
structure that provides a means for CO2 operators to take subsurface
property by eminent domain if it is necessary, assuming that lawmakers
deem CO2 sequestration to be a more important public use than the cur-
rent use of the subsurface. The remainder of this Part considers more
fully the idea of public use as well as a framework for implementing such
a regulatory structure.
A. Eminent Domain Authority and Public Use
If policymakers wish to pursue CCS as a major part of the nation's
response to climate change, it will be necessary to create a means to ac-
quire the pore space necessary to store billions of tons of CO 2. This will
potentially require obtaining property rights from thousands of surface
owners and mineral owners, any one of which could hold up a CCS
project if the government and CCS operators do not have the power of
eminent domain.3 89 Any federal legislation authorizing eminent domain
would need to declare that CO2 sequestration for purposes of addressing
climate change is a "public use" under the U.S. Constitution, as well as
grant eminent domain authority to private parties to facilitate CO 2 se-
388. See supra Part ll.B.
389. Anderson, supra note 138, at 108-09 (explaining that eminent domain authority is necessary
to prevent any owner, whether surface or mineral, from blocking a sequestration project and that emi-
nent domain authority can be particularly useful in situations where estates may have been highly sev-
ered and would otherwise require separate consent from each individual interest holder).
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questration upon receipt of a permit or certificate authorizing the seques-
tration basin. 90
The EPA and states with delegated authority currently regulate and
permit injection of substances, including CO 2, pursuant to the UIC Pro-
gram administered under the Safe Drinking Water Act.391 In order to
implement large-scale injection and sequestration of CO 2 to reduce GHG
emissions, however, there will likely need to be federal legislation that
specifically authorizes such injection and sequestration into designated
underground basins that cover multi-state areas. Based on the analysis
above, at least some of the subsurface area within those sequestration
basins will lie beneath private property. As a result, any federal legisla-
tion governing large-scale CO 2 sequestration should include provisions
that authorize the federal government, state governments, and/or private
parties to exercise the right of eminent domain.
As discussed in Part II, under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the government has the power to take private property by
eminent domain so long as it is taken for "a public use" and "just com-
pensation" is paid.319 Courts have broadly interpreted "public use" to in-
clude not only the use of property for schools, railroads, post offices and
the like that will be put into "use by the public," but also a wide range of
more controversial "public purposes" connected to land development,
such as the government transfer of private property from one private
owner to another to develop the property in a way that will eliminate
blight or simply increase the tax base for the community. 393 Establishing
that the sequestration of CO 2 to reduce GHG emissions is a "public pur-
pose" that justifies the use of eminent domain consistent with the Fifth
Amendment will be made easier by the growing recognition of the dan-
gers of climate change. There is now broad consensus that climate
change poses a significant threat to human health and the environment.3 94
The use of private property to aid in addressing that threat would appear
to be in the public interest, for a public benefit, and for a public purpose,
and thus is likely constitutional so long as just compensation is paid.
390. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, see infra notes 392-400 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
392. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
393. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484-86 (2005) (finding that City of New Lon-
don's exercise of its eminent domain power to take private residences in connection with development
of a corporate headquarters for Pfizer Corporation to increase the city's tax base and spur develop-
ment in an economically distressed area was a "public purpose" consistent with the Fifth Amend-
ment).
394. See, e.g., Rais Akhtar, et al., Human Health, in IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND VULNERABILITY 393 (Martin Parry et al. eds.,
2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter8.pdf; see also Endangerment
and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,
74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I); U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean
Air Act, http:l/www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited Jan. 29,2010).
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Moreover, in Kelo v. City of New London,395 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed a very broad interpretation of the public use clause, confirm-
ing that it was not limited to "use by the public" but included any pur-
pose of public benefit, public interest, or value to the community.3%
Thus, in Kelo, the Court held that the City of New London's actions to
take a private residence to facilitate development of a new corporate
headquarters for Pfizer Corporation and increase the community's tax
base was a "public use" that supported the exercise of eminent domain
authority with payment of just compensation.3" Likewise, courts have
upheld the use of eminent domain authority in connection with the crea-
tion of subsurface natural gas storage basins and held that secondary re-
covery, field unitization, and subsurface waste injection are all a benefit
to the community and in the public interest. 398 Currently, the Obama
Administration has declared that implementing CCS will be major part
of its approach to addressing climate change.3" Based on that policy and
the judicial precedent in the area of public use, it is likely courts will find
that sequestration of CO2 for purposes of combating climate change is a
public use. Indeed, at the current time climate change is seen as one of
the country's most pressing environmental needs, and thus there is a very
strong argument that implementing a technology to address that need is
a public use, particularly if such sequestration is carried out pursuant to
federal or state legislation declaring it a public use and supporting that
declaration with the appropriate scientific findings and data.4"
B. The Natural Gas Act Model
To the extent the federal government wishes to enlist private CCS
operators in implementing large-scale CO2 sequestration, Congress will
need to enact legislation that not only establishes that such sequestration
is a public use, but also specifically grants the power of eminent domain
to such private actors. One model for granting such authority and regu-
lating its use is the Natural Gas Act."' Under the Natural Gas Act, a
natural gas company that wishes to construct an interstate natural gas
pipeline or obtain subsurface property for natural gas storage must ob-
tain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from FERC.4°2 Af-
ter the company submits an application for a certificate that describes the
project and establishes why the project is required and is in the public in-
395. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.
396. Id. at 485-89.
397. Id. at 483-85.
398. See supra Part II.C.
399. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Press Briefing in the Trip of the President to Canada
(Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress..office/PressBriefing-2/17/09/.
400. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84 (focusing on comprehensiveness of city's plan and thoroughness
of deliberations in upholding city's determination of public use); id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(same).
401. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (2006).
402. Id. § 717f(c)(1)(a).
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terest, FERC files a public notice of the application in the Federal Regis-
ter, solicits public comment, and conducts a public hearing on the appli-
cation.403 As part of its evaluation, FERC must, among other things, in-
vestigate the environmental consequences of the project under the
National Environmental Policy Act.4°4 At the end of the process, FERC
issues a certificate if it finds that the proposed project "is or will be re-
quired by the present or future public convenience and necessity." 4 5
Once FERC has issued the certificate, the Natural Gas Act empow-
ers the certificate holder to exercise "the right of eminent domain" to ob-
tain easements and other property interests needed for the project if such
property interests cannot be obtained through voluntary contractual ne-
gotiations. 4°6 Moreover, although the Natural Gas Act itself does not
provide for a "quick-take" process whereby the certificate holder can ob-
tain possession of the property prior to the determination of just com-
pensation, numerous courts have authorized certificate holders to obtain
such immediate possession through the equitable remedy of a prelimi-
nary injunction. 401 As a result, after depositing an amount of money with
the court equal to the appraised value of the property and establishing
sufficient financial viability to pay any additional amounts awarded by
the court, the certificate holder can begin construction of the pipeline or
natural gas storage area while the amount of compensation owed is still
being litigated.4
This structure under the Natural Gas Act for reviewing projects and
authorizing the right of eminent domain can serve as a partial model for
CCS legislation. Congress could enact CCS legislation that creates a
comprehensive regulatory, geologic, and environmental review process
to determine whether a CCS sequestration project is in the public inter-
est. This process, which could be conducted by FERC or another agency
with mandatory input or consultation from the EPA and other federal
agencies, would be subject to public notice, comment, geologic review,
environmental review, and other expert review. A determination that
the project is in the public interest would result in FERC, or whichever
federal agency is granted authority over such review, issuing a certificate
that indicates the project is in the public interest. The CCS operator
holding the certificate would then be authorized to exercise the power of
403. Id. § 717(f(c)(1)(b); 18 C.F.R. § 157.1 (2008).
404. 18 C.F.R. § 157.9(b); see also National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335; E.
Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 818 (4th Cir. 2004) (describing the process of obtaining a
certificate of public convenience and necessity under the Natural Gas Act).
405. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e).
406. Id. § 717f(h).
407. See E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 827 (granting immediate possession to natural gas
company after issuance of order recognizing right of eminent domain under the Natural Gas Act but
before determination of just compensation and citing other cases granting similar immediate posses-
sion). See generally Jim Behnke & Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to Immediate Entry by Private
Entities Exercising Federal Eminent Domain Authority Under the Natural Gas Act and the Federal
Power Act, 27 ENERGY L.J. 499 (2006).
408. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 407, at 530.
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eminent domain to obtain any necessary property interests if it cannot
obtain such interests through voluntary contractual negotiations. Con-
gress could also specifically grant "quick-take" authority to the certificate
holder so that project implementation may begin before the final deter-
mination of just compensation.
As discussed earlier, simply because a private party owns land
above a proposed CO2 sequestration basin does not mean that private
party has a "property interest" in the subsurface that can be acquired on-
ly by eminent domain. In cases where Congress, the states, or the courts
have recognized a property interest, however, the CCS operator would
be able to exercise the right of eminent domain to obtain these subsur-
face property rights with payment of just compensation.
Such federal legislation authorizing eminent domain to obtain sub-
surface pore space for CO2 sequestration may or may not also create a
structure for payment of compensation. The Natural Gas Act does not
create such a structure for payment of compensation, choosing instead to
implicitly assume the existence of property rights in the subsurface and
allow the courts to address any disputes over the amount of just compen-
sation using the principles of state law.419 Another option, though, as
stated above, would be to create a presumption that any private pore
space property is of no value or of nominal value, but give surface or
mineral owners an opportunity to present evidence in an administrative
proceeding that current or reasonably foreseeable non-CCS uses will be
impaired by CO, sequestration, and that the value of the property is re-
duced as a result.4 10 Any administrative decision on this issue could then
be made appealable to federal or state district court.
In addition to creating a structure to assess the value of the subsur-
face property in any statutory eminent domain proceeding, another issue
that needs to be addressed is whether the government or private CCS
operators should be required to compensate surface owners up front for
the fact that their land will be located above significant amounts of in-
jected CCS for hundreds to thousands of years. While experts believe
the risks associated with such sequestration are small, the fact remains
that those surface owners with CO2 beneath their land will bear those
risks far more heavily than the remainder of the population, all of whom
will benefit equally from reduced CO2 in the atmosphere.411 While the
jurisprudence regarding valuation of property under the Constitution for
just compensation purposes cannot easily take that increased risk to hu-
man health and the environment into account, Congress could establish a
409. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (stating that practice and procedure for Natural Gas Act condemna-
tion actions shall conform as much as possible to the state law where the property is situated).
410. See MCCOY, supra note 194, at 9 (distinguishing the need for compensation in natural gas
storage cases from CO2 storage cases because natural gas storage is often displacing developable oil
and gas resources, and arguing that compensation for use of pore space for CO2 storage should only be
required where the property owner shows impairment of a pre-existing economic interest).
411. Klass & Wilson, supra note 83, at 13.
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payment system separate and apart from just compensation to reflect
that risk.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores the role of property rights in current efforts to
develop the technology to transport, inject, and store underground mil-
lions to billions of tons of CO2 per year as a means to reduce atmospheric
CO 2 emissions and address climate change. Ultimately, we conclude that
precedent supports a range of options that policymakers and courts can
adopt when it comes to determining private property rights in the subsur-
face. Assuming that CO2 sequestration will implicate at least some pri-
vate property interests, we propose a federal statutory framework for ac-
quiring deep subsurface pore space rights and paying any compensation
owed. We conclude sequestration of CO2 will likely be found to be a
"public use" under the Fifth Amendment because of its potentially im-
portant role in combating climate change, and thus an eminent domain
action would be lawful. Ultimately, CCS is a promising technology that
may play a major role in efforts to address climate change. Before it can
be implemented on a large scale, however, policymakers and courts must
identify, analyze, and begin to resolve these important property rights is-
sues. This Article is an effort to provide a roadmap to assist in that end.
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